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FINANCIAL REWARDS FOR 
WHISTLEBLOWING LAWYERS 
KATHLEEN CLARK* 
NANCY J. MOORE** 
Abstract: The federal government increasingly relies on whistleblowers to 
ferret out fraud, awarding over $4 billion to whistleblowers under the False 
Claims Act (“FCA”) and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). May lawyers ethically seek these whistle-
blower rewards? Several lawyers have tried unsuccessfully to serve as FCA 
whistleblowers. Additional lawyers may be seeking whistleblower rewards 
under Dodd-Frank, but the secrecy of the award process prevents us from 
knowing whether they have sought or received awards. This is the first Article 
to analyze in-depth the key questions for determining whether a lawyer may 
seek a federal whistleblower award: (1) When may a lawyer disclose a client’s 
confidential information? (2) When does a lawyer’s obligation of loyalty pre-
clude seeking a personal benefit by disclosing a crime or fraud? (3) Do federal 
whistleblower laws preempt state ethics standards? (4) Which state’s ethics 
law applies when several states have significant contacts with the matter? 
These questions are enormously complex. Confidentiality exceptions differ 
widely among states. Lawyers are bound not just by conflict of interest rules, 
but also by the common-law duty not to profit from a client’s confidential in-
formation. While several federal courts have summarily rejected FCA 
preemption of state ethics standards, none of them confronted the fact that the 
FCA preempts state law fiduciary and contractual duties that would prevent 
nonlawyer insiders from serving as whistleblowers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal government increasingly relies on whistleblowers to assist 
in the enforcement of legal norms. This reliance is reflected not just in stat-
utes promising protection for whistleblowers that experience retaliation, but 
also in other statutes providing large financial incentives for whistleblow-
ers. The oldest of these statutes is the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”),1 
originally enacted in 1863 to enable whistleblowers (often organizational 
insiders) to file qui tam lawsuits in the name of the federal government 
against companies that have made false claims for payment from the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 1 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). 
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ernment. These whistleblowers (“relators”) have a right to 10–30% of any 
resulting verdict or settlement, and have been awarded more than $4 billion 
in the years since Congress strengthened the statute in 1986.2 Based in part 
on the FCA’s track record, Congress recently expanded the availability of 
whistleblower financial incentives by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), which re-
quired the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to give financial 
awards to whistleblowers who report securities violations to the SEC.3 If a 
whistleblower’s tip results in sanctions of greater than $1 million, the whis-
tleblower can receive between 10–30% of the sanction amount.4 The SEC 
receives thousands of these tips every year, and has issued awards reaching 
into eight figures. 
Lawyers for companies that do business with the government and for 
publicly traded companies have access to the kind of information that a whis-
tleblower would need to file a qui tam FCA lawsuit or to file a whistleblower 
tip with the SEC. May lawyers—like other organizational insiders—take ad-
vantage of these financial incentives? Neither the FCA nor Dodd-Frank spe-
cifically addresses this question. As the government’s reliance on whistle-
blowers has expanded, it is increasingly important to identify when lawyers—
like others—may take advantage of these whistleblower incentives. 
A handful of lawyers have sued their former clients as qui tam relators 
under the FCA, although to date none have been successful.5 Among the 
obstacles confronting lawyer-relators are their obligations of confidentiality 
and loyalty under applicable state ethics rules; indeed, three of these law-
suits were dismissed based on findings that the lawyers had violated their 
ethical duties under state law. Apparently relying on aspects of these FCA 
cases, the SEC’s recently enacted Dodd-Frank whistleblower regulations 
exclude information learned in the course of a lawyer-client relationship 
unless a lawyer is permitted to disclose that information under either state 
confidentiality rules or the regulations that the SEC promulgated under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) of 2002.6 But the SEC’s Dodd-Frank regula-
tions do not address whether lawyers are eligible to receive a whistleblower 
                                                                                                                           
 2  CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS—OVERVIEW 2 (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/file/fcastatspdf/download [http://perma.cc/TX4V-L98C]. The government 
has recovered more than $30 billion through these qui tam suits during the same period. Id. 
 3 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 5 See infra notes 26–77 and accompanying text. Lawyers have also sued non-client third par-
ties based on information obtained while representing a client. See infra notes 170–197. 
 6 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iv) 
(2011). 
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award when their conduct violates their loyalty obligations under state con-
flict of interest rules or fiduciary law. 
Should lawyers be permitted to receive financial rewards under the 
FCA and Dodd-Frank whistleblower programs? There are significant finan-
cial disincentives to engaging in whistleblowing. It can result not just in the 
end of a job, but the end of a career. Whistleblower awards can counteract 
these disincentives, for lawyers as well as for other insiders. Indeed, the 
SEC might argue that SOX expanded lawyers’ confidentiality exceptions 
and granted them additional discretion to make whistleblowing disclosures. 
Yet years after the legislation’s enactment, there is little evidence that law-
yers have actually made disclosures to prevent, mitigate, or rectify client 
fraud. Lawyers—like others—may need whistleblower awards to counteract 
the financial disincentives for blowing the whistle. 
But a client-lawyer relationship is, in some respects, different from 
other relationships. Lawyers can play a critical role in ensuring that clients 
understand and comply with the law. Some argue that this distinctive role 
means that we should not grant whistleblower awards to a company’s law-
yers,7 particularly when lawyers who would seek such awards may violate 
duties of confidentiality or loyalty,8 even if we grant such awards to compa-
ny employees who violate similar confidentiality or loyalty duties under 
state law. 
Despite the obvious importance of such questions, it is not our purpose 
to engage in a normative analysis of federal whistleblower rewards to law-
yers. Rather, we believe that before the normative question can be properly 
addressed, we need a more detailed understanding of the complex issues 
raised when lawyers seek federal whistleblower awards. Our descriptive 
agenda includes detailing the nuances of both confidentiality and loyalty 
obligations under state ethics laws, which vary significantly from state to 
state, particularly with respect to confidentiality exceptions. We also briefly 
discuss possible federal preemption of state ethics laws and the confounding 
choice of law issues raised in an era when lawyers perform their work in 
multiple jurisdictions, often far removed from their state of licensure. 
Part I of this Article examines the relevant ethics law in light of the 
operation of the FCA’s unusual qui tam litigation procedures for whistle-
blowers who sue in the name of the government. Part II does the same with 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as Whistleblow-
ers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1054 (2015). 
 8 See id.; see also N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 746, at 
13–15 (2013), https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications1647_0.pdf [http://perma.
cc/VUU3-EXJW]; Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, N.Y. ST. B.A.J. 11, 16–17 (2012). 
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respect to the Dodd-Frank statute and the SEC regulations for its whistle-
blower award program. Within each of these sections, we address how law-
yers’ professional obligations of confidentiality and loyalty may affect their 
ability to qualify for financial awards. After describing the particulars of the 
FCA and Dodd-Frank whistleblower reward programs, we begin our ethics 
analysis with a brief discussion of the few FCA cases that have addressed 
the confidentiality and loyalty obligations of lawyer-relators. Although 
these cases address some of the relevant issues applicable under both the 
FCA and Dodd-Frank,9 they do not address or fully explore the wide range 
of ethical issues that we identify as arising under applicable ethics law. We 
analyze these issues first under the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and then under the significant state 
variations, which exist primarily with respect to confidentiality. Within each 
category, we address lawyers’ obligations to both current and former clients, 
not only when the target of the lawyer’s disclosure is the client itself, but 
also when the target is a third party about whom the lawyer acquired infor-
mation while representing a client. 
With respect to the lawyer’s obligation of confidentiality, one of the is-
sues we consider is whether it is ever “reasonably necessary” for a lawyer 
to actively seek a whistleblower reward in order to “prevent, mitigate or 
rectify” the substantial economic harm that may result from a client’s crime 
or fraud, especially when to do so requires the lawyer to file and actively 
litigate an FCA lawsuit against a current or former client.10 We also explore 
whether and under what circumstances whistleblower rewards are justified 
in states that permit disclosure solely to prevent future wrongdoing, given 
that the federal reward programs are based on establishing a company’s past 
wrongdoing. We conclude that, contrary to the apparent view of the courts 
in the existing FCA cases, it may be difficult for lawyer-whistleblowers to 
avoid violating state confidentiality rules, even in jurisdictions that permit 
disclosure to rectify past wrongdoing. 
It may be difficult, but not impossible. Thus, we also consider, as did a 
federal district court in a recent FCA case, whether lawyers’ obligations of 
loyalty affect lawyers seeking whistleblower awards, even when confidenti-
ality rules do not prohibit the requisite disclosure. For example, we consider 
whether a lawyer may continue to represent a client while seeking a whis-
tleblower award, even on a matter unrelated to the lawyer’s ongoing work. 
                                                                                                                           
 9 There are no reported cases involving lawyer-whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank. Although 
there are some differences in applying applicable ethics law to the two statutory programs, the 
issues are similar. As a result, the FCA cases are helpful in analyzing the ethical obligations of 
both FCA and Dodd-Frank whistleblowers. 
 10 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
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We also explore whether former-client conflicts rules or common-law fidu-
ciary duties prevent a lawyer from seeking a whistleblower award, as well 
as whether and when lawyers are obligated to inform their clients that they 
have disclosed damaging information to governmental authorities. Here we 
also conclude that, although there are many open issues, ethics law presents 
substantial obstacles to lawyers acting in pursuit of their own interests, even 
when confidentiality rules permit them to disclose for other purposes. This 
law includes both conflict of interest rules for current clients, which are par-
ticularly salient for lawyers seeking to take advantage of the anonymity 
promised by Dodd-Frank, and a common-law fiduciary duty that prohibits 
lawyers (and other fiduciaries) from profiting from the use of confidential 
client information. This common-law duty applies to both current and for-
mer representation and also precludes lawyers from pursuing whistleblower 
awards against non-client third parties without the client’s consent, even 
when doing so will not harm the client. 
Part III briefly addresses whether the federal whistleblower incentives 
under the FCA and Dodd-Frank preempt any aspects of state ethics laws 
regarding confidentiality and loyalty that would prevent a lawyer from par-
ticipating in these whistleblower incentive programs. The few FCA deci-
sions that have addressed the lawyer-relator issue agree that there has been 
no such preemption. But their discussion of the issue is minimal and ignores 
other FCA cases denying a defendant permission to assert a counterclaim 
against a nonlawyer-relator for breach of contract or breach of fiduciary 
duty when the assertion of such claims would undermine the federal gov-
ernment’s strong interest in encouraging whistleblowers to come forward. 
These nonlawyer-relator cases do not explicitly use preemption analysis, 
but the result nevertheless appears to be that at least some nonlawyer obli-
gations under state law are being preempted by the FCA. We then address 
whether lawyers’ obligations under state standards might be treated differ-
ently under the FCA than the obligations of nonlawyers. As for Dodd-
Frank, the SEC regulations expressly provide that more restrictive state 
confidentiality standards are preempted by the preexisting SOX lawyer 
whistleblower regulations. But the Dodd-Frank regulations do not mention 
lawyers’ loyalty obligations under state conflict of interest rules or fiduciary 
law. As a result, it is unclear whether and to what extent those obligations 
are impliedly preempted by the Dodd-Frank whistleblower bounty program. 
Assuming that at least some state ethics rules are not preempted by the 
FCA or Dodd-Frank, Part IV introduces the difficult choice of law issues 
that may arise as a result of the considerable variation in state confidentiali-
ty rules. Both the FCA and the Dodd-Frank award programs involve nation-
al companies with multiple offices, as well as in-house lawyers who may 
not be licensed in the state where they advise the company. As a result, a 
2015] Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers 1703 
lawyer is unable to predict with certainty which state’s ethics rules govern. 
Because the SEC’s Dodd-Frank regulation apparently preempts state confi-
dentiality rules that are stricter than the SEC’s own SOX regulation, and 
because loyalty provisions do not differ significantly from state to state, we 
focus our choice of law discussion on the difficult issues that arise when a 
federal court attempts to determine the ethical propriety of a lawyer-
relator’s disclosure of confidential client information in bringing a qui tam 
lawsuit. Several FCA cases have briefly addressed choice of law issues in 
such a national setting, but we conclude that these decisions do not ade-
quately confront the complexities of determining not only whose choice of 
law rule controls—the federal district court, the forum state, or some other 
state—but also whether a litigation or nonlitigation choice of law rule 
should apply. Although we do not thoroughly explore the choice of law is-
sues raised here, we recommend that federal courts consider developing 
their own federal common-law choice of law rule for FCA lawsuits, perhaps 
incorporating existing approaches such as the ABA Model Rules’ nonlitiga-
tion choice of law provision or the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws’ agency provisions. 
This Article concludes with a summary of our findings. In addition, 
although we do not address the normative question of whether lawyers 
should be entitled to seek whistleblower rewards, we express concern about 
whether it is ever appropriate, as is provided under Dodd-Frank, for deter-
minations of lawyer eligibility to be conducted in secret, in a process largely 
insulated from judicial review. 
I. QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A. Primer on the FCA 
The FCA enables almost anyone to file a lawsuit in the name of the 
United States to recover monies from someone who made false claims for 
payment from the government.11 In an FCA case, the relator files a complaint 
with the district court under seal and provides the U.S. Department of Justice 
with the complaint and a “written disclosure of substantially all material evi-
dence and information the person possesses.”12 The defendant does not re-
                                                                                                                           
 11 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729; JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 
§ 4.01[B] (4th ed. 2011) (stating that “virtually anyone can be a qui tam relator”). The statute 
excludes current or former members of the armed forces from serving as a relator if they are suing 
another member of the armed forces based on that other member’s service. 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3730(e)(1)–(2) (2012). The statute also excludes members of Congress, the Judiciary, and “sen-
ior executive branch officials” from being named as defendants where the suit is “based on evi-
dence or information known to the Government when the action was brought.” Id. 
 12 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
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ceive the complaint until the court lifts the seal.13 This gives the government 
an opportunity to investigate the relator’s allegations and determine whether 
to participate in the relator’s FCA case (or even to file criminal charges). 
Ultimately, the government has four options.14 It can: (1) ask the court 
to dismiss the relator’s case,15 (2) settle the case prior to formal interven-
tion,16 (3) intervene and take over the conduct of the lawsuit,17 or (4) decline 
to intervene, allowing the relator to conduct the lawsuit.18 The government 
intervenes in only 27% of FCA cases,19 but intervened cases account for 
almost all (about 97%) of qui tam recoveries.20 
Courts generally view FCA suits as sounding in fraud, and therefore im-
pose on FCA complaints the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,21 which requires a complaint alleging 
fraud to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-
take.”22 This means that prior to civil discovery, the relator must generally 
have in hand evidence of the specific false claims for payment to the govern-
ment, what they were for, and who made them. As a result, the FCA relators 
who can meet this requirement are generally individuals who had access to 
and retained copies of specific information about an organization’s false 
claims. In other words, most FCA relators are organizational insiders. 
The FCA statute does not require relators to have entirely clean hands. 
It excludes relators who have been “convicted of criminal conduct arising 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. 
 14 BOESE, supra note 11, § 4.05. 
 15 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A). 
 16 Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). 
 17 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(A).  
 18 Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). If the government declines to intervene, the relator controls the litiga-
tion but, at the government’s request, must serve the Justice Department with all filings, enabling 
the government to monitor the proceedings. Id. § 3730(c)(3). In most of the cases where the gov-
ernment has declined to intervene, relators seek voluntary dismissal of the case. See David Kwok, 
Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 239–40 (2013) (noting the low success rate, 9%, of non-intervened cases). 
 19 David Y. Kwok, The Private Enforcement of Government Interests Under the False Claims 
Act 18 (Spring 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley), http://
escholarship.org/uc/item/779978c6 [http://perma.cc/5E2Q-RSKH]. 
 20 See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 2 (from 1987 until 2014, the gov-
ernment recovered more than $30 billion through qui tam lawsuits, but only $1 billion came from 
non-intervened cases). 
 21 See Kathleen M. Boozang, The New Relators: In-House Counsel and Compliance Officers, 
6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 16, 18 (2012); see also REUBEN A. GUTTMAN & JACOB R. KIRKHAM, 
GRANT & EISENHOFER, P.A.,
 
FRONTLOADING THE CASE: THEME & THEORY IN FALSE CLAIMS 
AND FRAUD LITIGATION 3 (2012) (on file with authors) (“Although the FCA is not technically a 
fraud statute, courts have almost unanimously required parties to plead in compliance with Rule 
9(b).”). 
 22 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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from his or her role in” the FCA violation,23 but that is a relatively low bar. 
The statute thus implicitly recognizes that some of the individuals most 
likely to possess the information necessary for an FCA case may have been 
involved in the FCA violation. As one of the framers of the original statute 
recognized in 1863, the qui tam provisions “are based upon the idea of ‘set-
ting a rogue to catch a rogue.’”24 Even a “rogue” can be eligible for a whis-
tleblower award.25 
B. Lawyers’ Confidentiality Obligations and the FCA 
This section explores whether lawyers’ confidentiality obligations re-
strict their ability to serve as FCA relators. We first examine how courts 
have addressed this issue in FCA cases involving lawyer-relators, and then 
discuss the confidentiality standards and exceptions found in the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and in state variations of those rules. 
1. FCA Case Law Regarding Lawyer-Relators 
Of the nearly ten-thousand qui tam FCA cases filed since 1986,26 we 
were unable to find any case in which a lawyer-relator sued a current client. 
We did, however, identify five cases in which a lawyer-relator sued a for-
mer client.27 In each of those cases, the lawyer alleged that he first ex-
pressed concern internally within the client company about the alleged FCA 
                                                                                                                           
 23 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3). 
 24 Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 213 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting CONG. 
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–56 (1863)). 
 25 See id. This feature of the statute has implications for whether FCA defendants should be 
able to bring counterclaims against relators. See infra notes 302–351 and accompanying text. 
 26 See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 2 (providing that 9960 qui tam 
cases were filed from Fiscal Years 1987 through 2014). 
 27 Four of these cases were filed under the federal False Claims Act. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. 
v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000); United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices 
Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA II), 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. 
Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C. (Repko I), 490 F. App’x 502 (3d Cir. 2012); United States ex rel. 
Doe v. X Corp. (Doe), 862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994). A fifth was filed under California’s 
False Claims Act. Bury v. Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1035 (May 8, 2002). In each of these cases, the lawyer-client relationship ended before the 
lawyer-relator filed his FCA lawsuit. Additional FCA cases have been brought by licensed law-
yers who learned about the alleged fraud while working as compliance officers rather than as 
lawyers. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Frazier v. IASIS Healthcare Corp., No. 2:05-cv-766-RCJ, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6896 (D. Az. Jan. 9, 2012). One legal commentator has asserted that such 
compliance officers are bound by lawyers’ professional confidentiality duties, see Boozang, supra 
note 21, at 10, but a recent bar ethics opinion concludes that they are not, see N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ 
Ass’n, supra note 8, at 14. 
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violation and that the client then retaliated against him.28 The government 
declined to intervene in any of these cases, and courts dismissed them be-
fore trial. Two of the cases were dismissed on grounds unrelated to legal 
ethics.29 In the remaining three, courts expressly evaluated how state confi-
dentiality standards applied to the lawyer-relators, dismissing the cases be-
cause applicable state ethics rules prohibited the lawyer-relator from dis-
closing the information necessary to move forward with the FCA lawsuit.30 
None of the courts ruled that lawyers were per se prohibited from serving as 
relators.31 
The first FCA case in which a court applied lawyer confidentiality 
standards to a lawyer-relator was United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., in 
1994.32 Lawyer-relator Doe worked in-house for a government contractor 
and alleged that the contractor violated the FCA by failing to disclose that 
the computers it sold contained remanufactured (rather than new) compo-
nents.33 Before filing the FCA lawsuit, the lawyer raised these concerns in-
ternally, and the company disclosed additional information to the federal 
government.34 But after the company terminated the lawyer,35 he threatened 
                                                                                                                           
 28 Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (affirming the district 
court’s dismissal of Doe’s wrongful termination lawsuit because Virginia’s public policy excep-
tion to employment at will did not extend to lawyers); X Corp. v. Doe (X Corp. II), 816 F. Supp. 
1086 (E.D. Va. 1993) (dismissing Doe’s 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) retaliation claim), aff’d sub nom. 
Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435. Before filing his FCA lawsuit, the lawyer-whistleblower in Stevens was 
fired by the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources after raising his concerns internally. Telephone 
Interview with Jonathan Stevens (Aug. 2, 2012); see also Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770 (noting that 
Stevens brought the action against his former employer). Bury filed a wrongful termination action 
against his former client. Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *3. Repko’s retaliation 
claim under the FCA was dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. United States ex rel. Repko 
v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 557 F. Supp. 2d 522, 528–29 (M.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 490 F. App’x 502. 
Bibi alleged that shortly after he raised concerns about the company’s practices, he was “‘frozen 
out’ by Unilab’s management,” “no longer asked for advice on compliance matters,” and “re-
placed as General Counsel.” FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 161. 
 29 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 784 (dismissed because the Supreme Court found that the defendant, 
an agency of a state government, could not be sued under the statute); Repko I, 490 F. App’x at 
503–05 (dismissed because the relator’s disclosure was not considered “voluntary,” as an earlier 
plea agreement required him to give the government information about the company’s illegal 
activities). 
 30 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 168; X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1095; Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1035, at *12. 
 31 See FLPA II, 734 F.3d 154; X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. 1086; Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 1035. But see Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 113 (Ill. 1991) (holding lawyers per se 
ineligible for whistleblower protection). 
 32 Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1504. 
 33 X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1092. The parties filed two other lawsuits related to this FCA 
case. The company obtained an injunction prohibiting the lawyer from disclosing confidential 
information, X Corp. v. Doe (X Corp. I), 805 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1992), and the lawyer filed 
a wrongful termination counterclaim against the company, Under Seal, 17 F.3d at 1435. 
 34 X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1086. 
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to sue for wrongful termination and provided the company with a copy of 
his draft complaint.36 The company preemptively filed a lawsuit against the 
lawyer, claiming that his planned disclosure of information in his wrongful 
termination complaint would violate his fiduciary duty and a confidentiality 
agreement he had signed.37 Although the company’s lawsuit against the 
lawyer was based on state (rather than federal) law, the company filed its 
lawsuit in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.38 It asked the court 
for an injunction requiring the lawyer to return allegedly misappropriated 
documents and prohibiting him from disclosing any confidential infor-
mation.39 
A month later, the lawyer filed his FCA lawsuit in that same federal 
district court.40 As required under the FCA, he provided a copy of his com-
plaint and supporting documentation to the Justice Department.41 The Jus-
tice Department became concerned that some of the supporting documenta-
tion was subject to the company’s attorney-client privilege and asked the 
court to hold the FCA lawsuit in abeyance while the company’s lawsuit 
against the lawyer proceeded.42 
In the company’s lawsuit against the lawyer, the district court applied 
the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility. The Code’s confidentiality 
rule allowed lawyers to disclose client fraud only if the evidence “clearly 
establishe[d]” that fraud.43 The court found that the disputed information 
was “arguably suggestive of a regulatory violation,” but fell “short of clear-
ly showing fraud.”44 In response to the company’s lawsuit, the court issued 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1302. 
 38 See id. 
 39 Id. The company also alleged that Doe breached his fiduciary duty to the company by re-
vealing confidences to his own attorney. Id. at 1301. The district court rejected the company’s 
claim that Doe’s disclosures to his own attorney breached his fiduciary obligation because that 
“would cripple Doe’s ability to defend against X Corp.’s attack on his professional conduct.” Id. at 
1301 n.5. 
 40 See Under Seal, 17 F.3d at 1435. 
 41 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). The FCA requires relators to serve the government with a copy 
of the complaint as well as “written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and infor-
mation the [relator] possesses.” Id. 
 42 Under Seal, 17 F.3d at 1435. 
 43 X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1298 (quoting VA. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C)(3) (VA. STATE BAR ASS’N 1983)). (The Virginia Code was in effect when the case was 
decided.) Virginia’s confidentiality rule permitted the disclosure of a client’s past fraud as long as 
the evidence “clearly establishe[d]” the fraud. Id. 
 44 Id. The Virginia Code lacked a broad “offensive use” exception analogous to the ABA’s 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(5). See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(5); VA. CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101. 
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an injunction prohibiting the lawyer from disclosing this information.45 The 
court eventually dismissed the lawyer-relator’s FCA case based on the ear-
lier injunction.46 While rejecting this particular lawyer-relator’s FCA suit, 
the court nonetheless exhibited solicitude rather than hostility for the con-
cept of a lawyer serving as a relator. It declared: “[T]o the extent that state 
law permits a disclosure of client confidences, such as to prevent a future or 
ongoing crime or fraud, then the attorney’s use of the qui tam mechanism to 
expose that fraud should be encouraged, not deterred.”47 
A second false claims case addressing lawyer confidentiality, Bury v. 
Community Hospitals of Central California, was decided in 2002.48 It in-
volved the former General Counsel of a hospital chain, Robert Bury, who 
sued his former employer under California’s (rather than the federal) False 
Claims Act four months after the hospital chain terminated him.49 The Cali-
fornia False Claims statute, like its federal counterpart, requires a “qui tam 
plaintiff [to] disclose to the Attorney General, in writing, ‘substantially all 
material evidence and information’ the qui tam plaintiff possesses.”50 The 
court noted the close parallel between this case and Doe, and took a similar 
approach.51 The issue in this case was whether Bury’s “duty of confidential-
ity and loyalty to his former client preclude[d] his qui tam complaint,”52 
because he was unable to “legally disclose sufficient information to form 
the basis of a valid complaint.”53 The court indicated that Bury could pro-
ceed with his California False Claims lawsuit only if he could “demonstrate 
that under California law . . . [his] duty of loyalty and confidentiality [did 
not] prevent[] him from legally disclosing sufficient information to support 
the complaint.”54 California’s confidentiality standard is even stricter than 
Virginia’s and lacks any exception for client fraud.55 Therefore Bury could 
not pursue his lawsuit; nor, under this logic, could any lawyer subject to 
California’s rules. 
                                                                                                                           
 45 X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1312. 
 46 X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1087. 
 47 Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507–08 (footnote omitted). 
 48 Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *2. 
 49 Id. Bury’s employment ended on October 30, 1998. Id. He filed his qui tam action on Feb-
ruary 8, 1999. Id. 
 50 Id. at *6 (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(c)(3) (West 2000)). 
 51 Id. at *7. 
 52 Id. at *10. 
 53 Id. at *5. 
 54 Id. at *8. 
 55 See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100(B) (STATE BAR OF CAL. 2015) (permitting 
disclosure of confidential client information to prevent criminal acts likely to result in death or 
substantial bodily harm). 
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A third lawyer-relator case applying lawyer confidentiality standards is 
United States ex rel. Fair Laboratory Practices Associates v. Quest Diag-
nostics, Inc., which was decided by the Southern District of New York in 
2011 (“FLPA I”) and affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit in 2013 (“FLPA II”).56 This federal FCA case alleged that from 1996 
through 2005, the pricing policy adopted by Unilab, a medical testing com-
pany, violated the criminal anti-kickback statute.57 The company’s General 
Counsel, Mark Bibi, raised concerns about the pricing policy within the 
company in 1996, and the company adjusted its policy in response.58 But in 
1999, new management came in and reinstated the earlier pricing policy.59 
After Bibi again raised concerns internally about the policy’s possible ille-
gality, the company removed him as General Counsel.60 
In 2005, Bibi and two other former Unilab executives created a corpo-
ration, Fair Laboratory Practices Associates (“FLPA”), for the purpose of 
bringing an FCA lawsuit against their former employer based on its alleged 
violations of the anti-kickback statute.61 The defendant sought dismissal of 
the lawsuit, arguing that Bibi violated his confidentiality obligation.62 Bibi 
argued that his disclosures were permitted under New York’s confidentiality 
rule,63 which allows a lawyer to disclose “confidential information to the 
extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a crime.”64 The issue was therefore whether the disclo-
sures that Bibi made in 2005 were permitted under New York’s confidenti-
                                                                                                                           
 56 United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA I), No. 
05-Civ.-5393 (RPP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011), aff’d, 734 F.3d 
154. The relator was a corporation, Fair Laboratory Practices Associates, owned by three individ-
uals: the former lawyer, former chief financial officer, and chief executive officer of the defendant 
company. Id. 
 57 Id. at *2 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) as the “Anti-Kickback Statute”). 
 58 Id. at *10. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at *12. 
 61 Id. at *16. 
 62 Id. at *17. 
 63 Id. at *35. 
 64 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2015). When Bibi 
worked for Unilab (1993–2000) and when he filed the FCA lawsuit in 2005, New York lawyers 
were bound by the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which was based on 
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. In 2009, New York adopted its Rules of 
Professional Conduct, which is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Roy 
Simon, Comparing the New NY Rules of Professional Conduct to the NY Code of Professional 
Responsibility, N.Y. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY REP. (Feb. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nysba
.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26634 [http://perma.cc/9PL6-R9EG] (discussing the 
drafting and adoption of the new rules and comparing them to the ABA Model Rules). On appeal 
in 2013, the Second Circuit based its decision on New York’s new rules, which it found to be the 
same in substance as New York’s previous code. See FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 157 n.1. 
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ality rule.65 The court found that it was reasonable for Bibi to believe that 
the defendant’s violations of the anti-kickback statute were ongoing in 
2005.66 But Bibi’s disclosures were nonetheless improper because they went 
beyond what was necessary to prevent the former client from committing a 
crime. In particular, the court found that Bibi’s “disclosure of confidences 
from the 1990s to March 2000” was not “necessary to prevent the commis-
sion or continuation of a crime in 2005.”67 Because New York permits dis-
closures in order to prevent, but not rectify, client crimes, a lawyer-relator 
bound by New York rules would be able to reveal information necessary to 
stop ongoing crimes or prevent future crimes, but not information about 
past crimes. Nor would a lawyer-relator be free to disclose ongoing or fu-
ture frauds that were not criminal under state or federal law. 
In addition to cases involving lawyer-relators suing former clients, we 
have identified about a dozen cases where a lawyer-relator used information 
learned in an earlier representation to sue a non-client third party.68 Courts 
dismissed most of these cases at an early stage of the litigation without ad-
dressing the lawyers’ ethics obligations, usually because the case was based 
on information that had been publicly disclosed and the relator did not qual-
ify as an “original source.”69 But in one of these cases, United States ex rel. 
Holmes v. Northrop Grumman, decided in 2015, the district court explicitly 
addressed the lawyer-relator’s confidentiality obligation, finding that he 
used the confidential information of a current client without proof that his 
client had given informed consent.70 
                                                                                                                           
 65 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *35. The confidentiality exceptions under New 
York’s rule are more limited than those in states that follow the Model Rules. See infra notes 78–
123 and accompanying text. 
 66 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *33–34 (“Bibi could have reasonably believed in 
2005 that [d]efendants had the intention to commit a crime.”); see also FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 164. 
 67 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *36–37; see id. at *36 (finding relators could 
have shown that there was a “continuing crime in 2005” by providing “evidence of Quest’s pric-
ing agreements . . . in effect in 2005”); see also FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 165. The district court also 
ruled that Bibi violated Rule 1.9(a), which prohibits subsequent conflicts of interest. FLPA I, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *38. Such a ruling, if it were followed, would be the death knell to 
lawyer-relators suing former clients. But the Second Circuit declined to adopt this reasoning, rely-
ing on confidentiality as the basis for dismissal of the suit. FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 165. 
 68 See infra notes 198–241 and accompanying text for a discussion of the loyalty concerns 
that arise in this context. 
 69 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148 
(2d Cir. 1993); see also Robert L. Vogel, The Public Disclosure Bar Against Qui Tam Suits, 24 
PUB. CONT. L.J. 477, 517 n.178 (1995) (noting that several of the earliest FCA cases addressing 
the “public disclosure bar” were brought by lawyer-relators and that “courts may have been con-
cerned with lawyer/client ‘parasitism,’” i.e., lawyers inappropriately benefiting from information 
they learned while representing clients). 
 70 United States ex rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman, No. 1:13cv85-HSO-RHW, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *24–26 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 2015). 
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Donald Holmes represented Munich Re, an insurer, in an arbitration 
proceeding with Northrup Grumman Corporation (“NGC”), a government 
contractor.71 In connection with that representation, Holmes filed a com-
plaint against NGC in federal district court seeking certain government 
documents for use in the arbitration.72 He obtained those documents subject 
to the court’s protective order.73 He then used the documents in a qui tam 
FCA lawsuit he filed pro se against NGC alleging that NGC had defrauded 
the government.74 
In the FCA lawsuit, the court granted NGC’s motion to disqualify 
Holmes as relator and to dismiss the complaint, finding that Holmes violat-
ed not only the protective order, but also the ethical rules on confidentiality, 
conflicts of interest, candor to a court, and misrepresentation.75 With respect 
to confidentiality, the court found that Holmes breached his duty to keep 
information related to the representation of Munich Re confidential when he 
revealed and used for his personal benefit the government documents he 
had obtained on his client’s behalf.76 The court also found that although 
Munich Re had indicated that it did not object to his decision to report 
NGC’s fraud, Holmes failed to prove that he had obtained Munich Re’s in-
formed consent before revealing its confidential information.77 
2. Lawyer Confidentiality Exceptions: The ABA Model Rules and State 
Variations 
In the cases discussed above where a lawyer-relator sued a former cli-
ent, the courts relied on the various confidentiality rules adopted in Virginia, 
California, and New York.78 The confidentiality rules found in these three 
states, however, were somewhat idiosyncratic and stand in contrast to the 
rules adopted by most states, which more closely track the approach found 
in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. This subsection exam-
ines how Model Rule 1.6 and some state variations would apply in this con-
text, addressing the issues that were raised in the three cases above as well 
as other issues that those courts did not address. 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Id. at *4. 
 72 Id.  
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at *5. 
 75 Id. at *33–34. 
 76 Id. at *26. 
 77 Id. at *25. 
 78 See, e.g., id. In Holmes, where the lawyer-relator acted pro se in filing an FCA lawsuit 
against a non-client third party, the Mississippi district court considered the ethics rules adopted in 
Mississippi and the District of Columbia as well as the ABA Model Rules in deciding to disquali-
fy the lawyer-relator. See id. 
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The obligation of confidentiality defined in the ABA Model Rules and 
adopted in most states is broad in scope, reaching all “information relating 
to the representation of a client.”79 But some jurisdictions, including New 
York, use a narrower formulation based on the earlier ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, reaching only information that is subject to the 
attorney-client privilege (“confidences”), or information that a client has 
specifically requested to be kept confidential or would be detrimental to the 
client if revealed (“secrets”).80 Under either formulation, the lawyer’s obli-
gation continues even after the lawyer-client relationship has ended.81 
The Model Rule on confidentiality includes several exceptions that are 
relevant to FCA lawyer-whistleblowers: two distinct but overlapping excep-
tions addressing client frauds and crime, and an exception for disputes be-
tween lawyer and client.82 One provision, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), permits dis-
closure in order “to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is 
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or 
property of another.”83 A second provision, Model Rule 1.6(b)(3), permits 
disclosure in order “to prevent, mitigate or rectify” such injury, even if the 
client’s crime or fraud has already occurred.84 Because some states (including 
New York) permit disclosure to prevent client wrongdoing but not to mitigate 
or rectify it, we must address these two provisions separately. 
                                                                                                                           
 79 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). 
 80 See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a)–(b) (D.C. BAR ASS’N 2015); N.Y. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(B)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 81 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c)(1)–(2). ABA Model Rule 1.9(c)(2) pro-
hibits a lawyer from disclosing a former client’s information; Model Rule 1.9(c)(1) prohibits a 
lawyer from using a former client’s information to the disadvantage of that former client. See id. 
 82 Id. r. 1.6. Another confidentiality exception that could come into play applies specifically to 
organizational clients. Under Model Rule 1.13(b), a lawyer for an organization must engage in 
internal whistleblowing if the lawyer knows that someone within the organization “is engaged in 
action . . . that is . . . a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and 
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization.” Id. r. 1.13(b). Under Model Rule 
1.13(c), if the organization “insists upon . . . an action . . . that is clearly a violation of law,” and 
“the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial 
injury to the organization,” then the lawyer may reveal confidential information even if Rule 1.6 
would not permit it. Id. r. 1.13(c). But such disclosure is permitted “only if and to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.” Id. Be-
cause this confidentiality exception applies only where the disclosure is necessary to prevent inju-
ry to the organization, it would not apply to the filing of an FCA lawsuit. While the filing of an 
FCA lawsuit may be necessary in order to prevent or rectify injury to the financial interests of the 
United States, it would never be necessary in order to prevent injury to the FCA defendant. 
 83 Id. r. 1.6(b)(2) (emphasis added). While Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) treats crimes and frauds the 
same, many states distinguish between crimes and non-criminal frauds, permitting disclosure in 
order to prevent a client’s crime but not to prevent a non-criminal fraud. 
 84 Id. r. 1.6(b)(3) (emphasis added). 
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To understand how these two exceptions operate, one must consider 
three distinct time frames for the crimes or frauds: those that will occur en-
tirely in the future, those that are ongoing, and those that occurred entirely 
in the past. If a client’s crime or fraud is entirely in the future (and if other 
criteria are met), then disclosure is permitted under either of these excep-
tions. But if an FCA violation has not yet occurred, there is no basis for an 
FCA lawsuit. If a client’s crime or fraud is ongoing (and if other criteria are 
met), then Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits disclosure to prevent its continuation, and 
Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits disclosure to mitigate or rectify financial harm that 
already occurred.85 If a client’s crime or fraud is entirely in the past, then 
Rule 1.6(b)(2) does not permit disclosure, but Rule 1.6(b)(3) permits disclo-
sure in order to mitigate or rectify financial harm that has already occurred. 
For a lawyer who is considering whether to file an FCA suit, a critical 
question is whether the applicable confidentiality standard permits disclo-
sure in order to mitigate or rectify the financial harm caused by a client’s 
past crime or fraud. The New York confidentiality rule permits disclosure in 
order to stop an ongoing crime, but not to rectify a past one.86 In FLPA II, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated that the lawyer-
relator was allowed to disclose information “necessary to prevent the com-
mission or continuation of a crime in 2005,” when he filed the FCA com-
plaint.87 But it ruled that he violated New York’s confidentiality rule be-
cause he also disclosed “confidences from the 1990s,” disclosures that were 
not necessary to stop the ongoing crime in 2005.88  Under the FLPA II 
court’s analysis, lawyers in New York and similar states may disclose only 
information that is necessary to stop ongoing criminal FCA violations.89 In 
theory, such a limited disclosure could form the basis for an FCA complaint 
focusing on ongoing violations. But it is not clear whether an FCA com-
plaint limited to ongoing (rather than past) violations could attract a rela-
tor’s lawyer, whose compensation is based on the ultimate verdict or settle-
ment, which, in turn, is based on the number and magnitude of the false 
claims that the defendant filed with the federal government. If there is a 
company history of filing false claims but the lawyer is ethically prohibited 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3). Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) also permits disclosure in order to prevent future 
financial harm that is “reasonably certain to result.” See id. r. 1.6(b)(3); see also FLPA II, 734 
F.3d at 164–65 (holding that New York’s exception for the prevention of crimes could justify the 
disclosure of ongoing crimes, but did not justify the disclosure of confidential information about 
facts that occurred more than five years before FLPA filed the FCA lawsuit). 
 86 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (permitting disclosure “to prevent the client 
from committing a crime”). 
 87 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 165 (quoting FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *36). 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. 
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from disclosing all but the most recent, then a relator’s lawyer may be unin-
terested in filing a lawsuit that would be so limited in scope. 
There is significant variation across states regarding confidentiality 
exceptions related to client crime or fraud. The Model Rules permit disclo-
sure to prevent a client’s crime or fraud only if the client used the lawyer’s 
services in committing that crime or fraud, but twenty-one states permit 
such disclosure even if the client did not use the lawyer’s services in the 
wrongdoing.90 Most states permit disclosure both to prevent future crimes 
or frauds and to mitigate or rectify past ones.91 If the confidentiality rule in 
one of these jurisdictions applies, the lawyer-relator will have the most lee-
way in disclosing a former client’s crime or fraud in the FCA lawsuit. Ten 
states (including New York) permit disclosure to prevent wrongdoing, but 
not to rectify or mitigate the harm caused by past wrongdoing. If the confi-
dentiality rule in one of these states applies, the lawyer-relator may be lim-
ited in the same way the Second Circuit limited lawyer Mark Bibi in FLPA 
II: permitting disclosure only to stop ongoing crimes and frauds.92 Fourteen 
states (including New York) permit disclosure to prevent crimes, but not to 
prevent non-criminal frauds. 93  New Jersey actually requires lawyers to 
make disclosures that can prevent crimes and frauds as well as illegal acts.94 
Six states (Alabama, California, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, and Rhode 
Island) lack any confidentiality exceptions for client fraud and monetary 
crimes—past, ongoing, or future.95 If this kind of restrictive confidentiality 
                                                                                                                           
 90 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2); LATHAM & WATKINS, ATTORNEYS AS 
SEC WHISTLEBLOWERS: CAN AN ATTORNEY BLOW THE WHISTLE ON A CLIENT AND GET A 
MONETARY AWARD? 23–28 (2013), http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/SEC-whistleblowers 
[http://perma.cc/X5ER-Z6T3]. Some of those states also permit disclosure to rectify or mitigate a 
client’s past crime or fraud, but only if the client used the lawyer’s services in that crime or fraud. 
As discussed below, disclosure in order to prevent a future fraud is unlikely to form the basis of an 
FCA lawsuit. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 91 See LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 90, at 23–28 (providing a chart of state ethics rules 
and permitted disclosures); see also ARIZ. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (STATE BAR OF 
ARIZ. 2015); HAW. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (HAW. STATE JUD. 2015); TENN. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (TENN. BAR ASS’N 2015).  
 92 See FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 165. 
 93 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2). The other states that permit disclo-
sure to prevent crimes but not non-criminal fraud are Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Nebras-
ka, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Florida and Vir-
ginia require disclosure to prevent crime but prohibit disclosure to prevent non-criminal fraud. 
LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 90, at 23–28. 
 94 N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (N.J. COURTS 2015). 
 95 ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (ALA. COURTS 2015); KY. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 3.130(1.6) (KY. BAR ASS’N 2015); MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-1.6 (MO. 
COURTS 2015); MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (STATE BAR OF MONT. 2011); R.I. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (R.I. JUDICIARY 2015). All of these states permit disclosure to 
prevent client crimes that would result in death or serious bodily injury, but not financial crimes. 
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rule applies, a lawyer-relator may run up against the same barrier that law-
yer Robert Bury faced in his unsuccessful state FCA lawsuit.96 
Aside from the temporal dimension, additional complications arise in 
applying the crime- and fraud-related exceptions. If such an exception ap-
plies, a lawyer may disclose only “to the extent the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves necessary” to stop the client’s ongoing fraud or crime,97 or to prevent, 
mitigate, or rectify injury resulting from the client’s past fraud or crime.98 
Some might contend that filing an FCA complaint is never “necessary”—
either to stop a client’s ongoing fraud or to prevent, mitigate, or rectify a 
past fraud—because a whistleblower could use other means to pursue those 
goals, such as simply informing the federal government of the client’s al-
leged fraud. This argument has some force. But in enacting the FCA’s qui 
tam provisions, Congress arguably has determined that protection of the 
government’s interest requires not just that whistleblowers be permitted to 
inform the government of these violations, but also that they be able to pur-
sue an FCA lawsuit on the government’s behalf, even where the government 
chooses not to participate in the suit.99 If a whistleblower simply informs 
the government of a violation, there is no guarantee that the government 
will devote the resources necessary to investigate the tip—let alone pursue 
an FCA lawsuit based on it.100 
The qui tam mechanism increases the number of FCA lawsuits by allow-
ing lawyers outside of the Justice Department to bring such suits.101 It may 
also increase the quality of information the government receives about FCA 
                                                                                                                           
ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; KY. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.130(1.6); MO. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-1.6; MONT. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6; R.I. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6. Alabama, Missouri, and Rhode Island permit “noisy withdrawal,” where 
a lawyer notifies a third party that the lawyer has withdrawn from representation and disaffirms 
any documents that the lawyer prepared. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt.; MO. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-1.6 cmt. 14; R.I. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 16. 
 96 See, e.g., Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035. 
 97 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2) (emphasis added). Although Model Rule 
1.6(b)(2) refers to the prevention of a crime or fraud, it also permits disclosure in order to prevent 
the continuation of an ongoing crime or fraud. An FCA violation that is entirely in the future (ra-
ther than ongoing) cannot form the basis for an FCA lawsuit. 
 98 Id. r. 1.6(b)(3). 
 99 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). 
 100 See id. Part of Congress’s motivation for the 1986 amendments reviving the qui tam 
mechanism was concern that the Justice Department was not energetically pursuing FCA lawsuits. 
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED 
STATES: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SHOULD COORDINATE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL REMEDIES TO 
EFFECTIVELY PURSUE FRAUD IN FEDERAL PROGRAMS, at i (1979) (“[The Department of] Justice 
is not making full use of civil remedies to . . . recover losses of program funds due to fraudulent 
activity.”). 
 101 See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 2. In fiscal year 2014, the Justice 
Department filed 92 FCA lawsuits and qui tam relators filed 713 suits. Id. 
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violations in that relators’ lawyers may identify the strongest cases and invest 
resources in preparing those cases.102 Most of the money that the government 
recovers under the FCA comes from qui tam cases rather than government-
initiated FCA lawsuits.103 The client intake function at a relators’ law firm—
particularly firms that are repeat players with established FCA practices—can 
serve to identify those cases that are most likely to be financially successful 
and exclude those that are least likely to result in successful verdicts or set-
tlements.104 By the time the government reviews qui tam complaints to decide 
whether to intervene, relators’ lawyers already have conducted a review, 
screening out cases that are least likely to succeed.105 
If the lawyer is still representing the client, there is an added layer to 
the “reasonably necessary” analysis. Model Rule 1.4 requires a lawyer to 
“keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter,” and to 
“explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”106 In light of these 
obligations, before a lawyer engages in external whistleblowing, he or she 
must communicate with the client about the risks stemming from the cli-
ent’s violations and how the client can mitigate those risks.107 If the lawyer 
is representing an organizational client and knows that someone “associated 
with the organization is engaged in action, [or] intends to act” in a way “that 
is a violation of . . . law that reasonably might be imputed to the organiza-
                                                                                                                           
 102 See Kwok, supra note 17, at 236–37 (noting that when firms spend more time identifying 
meritorious cases the Department of Justice is more likely to intervene and win). 
 103 See CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 2. Of the $44.7 billion recovered 
under the FCA, more than two-thirds ($30.3 billion) came from qui tam cases. Id. 
 104 See, e.g., Robert L. Vogel, Deciding Whether to File a Qui Tam Suit, VOGEL, SLADE & 
GOLDSTEIN, LLP (Mar. 2012), http://vsg-law.com/false-claims-act-attorney-legal-guidance/deciding-
whether-to-file-a-qui-tam-suit/ [http://perma.cc/C6E4-FCPV]. 
 105 See The False Claims Act Correction Act: Strengthening the Government’s Most Effective 
Tool Against Fraud for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 2041 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 
110th Cong. 412 (2008) (statement of John E. Clark, Of Counsel, Goode, Casseb, Jones, Riklin, 
Choate & Watson, P.C.) (asserting that relators’ lawyers “choose their cases carefully and always 
try to choose cases that the Government will . . . intervene in”). Two empirical studies found that 
experienced relators’ firms cannot be accurately characterized as “filing mill[s]” that “exercise 
little discretion” in choosing cases and “simply file anything remotely meritorious.” Kwok, supra 
note 19, at 17; see also David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evi-
dence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1317 (2012). The skill of the relators’ 
bar in identifying strong cases may be reflected in the fact that most of the money recovered under 
the FCA comes from qui tam (rather than Justice Department-initiated) cases. On the other hand, 
the Justice Department intervenes in only 27% of qui tam cases, and most relators’ lawyers volun-
tarily dismiss cases in which the Justice Department does not intervene. See Kwok, supra note 17, 
at 239–40 (discussing the success rates of intervened and non-intervened qui tam cases). 
 106 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(3), (b). 
 107 See id. Model Rule 1.4 would require a lawyer to inform the client before filing an FCA 
lawsuit, but the FCA’s seal provision prohibits such a disclosure. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
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tion, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to” it, then the lawyer 
must engage in internal whistleblowing, which will ordinarily require the 
lawyer to “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization.”108 There-
fore, before engaging in external whistleblowing to prevent an organiza-
tional client from committing—or continuing an ongoing—crime or fraud 
under Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), the lawyer would first have to engage in inter-
nal whistleblowing. If the issue is rectification of an organizational client’s 
past crime or fraud under 1.6(b)(3), then Model Rule 1.13(b) does not man-
date internal whistleblowing, but the Rule 1.4 obligation to keep the client 
informed would still apply.109 On the other hand, if the lawyer no longer 
represents the client, then neither 1.4 nor 1.13(b) would apply.110 
In addition, these exceptions apply only in situations involving a fraud 
or crime, and the FCA does not map perfectly onto this requirement for a 
fraud or crime. The Model Rules define “fraud” as “conduct that is fraudulent 
under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has 
a purpose to deceive.”111 An FCA violation, on the other hand, can occur even 
where a defendant did not specifically intend to defraud the government.112 A 
violation can be triggered where the defendant had “reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the information” it submitted to the government.113 There-
fore, only those FCA cases where the defendant had a purpose to deceive will 
qualify for the fraud-related exception to confidentiality.114 
Another confidentiality exception, Model Rule 1.6(b)(5), allows a 
lawyer to disclose information in order “to establish a claim . . . on behalf of 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b). 
 109 See id. rr. 1.4, 1.6(b)(3), 1.13(b). 
 110 See infra notes 197–241 and accompanying text. 
 111 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(d). 
 112 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). But see United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 596 (11th Cir. 
1983) (holding that in a criminal prosecution for filing a false claim under 18 U.S.C. § 287, the 
government must show that the defendant acted with “specific intent to violate the law or with a 
consciousness that what he was doing was wrong”). 
 113 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (defining the term “knowingly” to include “act[ing] in reckless 
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”); see John T. Boese, Of Counsel, Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Paper Presented at the Tenth National Institute on the Civil False 
Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement: Fundamentals of the Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam 
Enforcement, at A-11 (June 4, 2014) (discussing the “reckless disregard” standard) (on file with 
authors). 
 114 These confidentiality exceptions apply only in situations involving “substantial injury” to 
someone’s “financial interests.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3). This 
requirement is likely to be met in qui tam lawsuits under the FCA because relators must be repre-
sented by counsel who are generally paid on a contingent basis. Relators’ counsel are unlikely to 
take on such representation unless the case has the potential for significant financial returns, so 
FCA cases will generally satisfy the “substantial injury” requirement of the crime- and fraud-
related exceptions. 
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the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.”115 The law-
yer-relator’s FCA lawsuit against a client is arguably “a controversy be-
tween the lawyer and the client,” both formally (because the relator is a par-
ty to the lawsuit) and in substance (because the U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that the FCA “effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government’s dam-
ages claim” to the relator116). On the other hand, some may view the situa-
tion—at least up until the FCA lawsuit is filed—as an inchoate controversy 
between the government and the company, rather than an actual controversy 
between the lawyer and the company. It is the filing of the FCA lawsuit that 
creates the partial assignment. Up until that point, the prospective relator is 
merely a potential witness to an inchoate dispute between the government 
and the prospective FCA defendant (rather than a party to a dispute between 
the government and the FCA defendant). Judges may look skeptically upon 
a lawyer who tries to use the 1.6(b)(5) confidentiality exception to justify 
the disclosures necessary for filing an FCA lawsuit. Most states have adopt-
ed the current formulation of Model Rule 1.6(b)(5),117 but three jurisdic-
tions—the District of Columbia, Michigan, and New York—limit a lawyer’s 
ability to use confidential information offensively against a client to situa-
tions where the lawyer is attempting to establish or collect unpaid legal fees 
(rather than pursuing other claims against the client).118 California lacks any 
express exception for disputes between lawyers and their clients. 
The discussion above focuses on the confidentiality obligations of a 
lawyer who wishes to sue a current or former client. In a different context—
where a lawyer wishes to sue a non-client third party—the confidentiality 
analysis differs. In that situation, the lawyer’s ability to disclose information 
depends on whether the applicable rule employs the narrower standard, reach-
                                                                                                                           
 115 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(5). Lawyer-whistleblowers who have expe-
rienced retaliation often invoke this exception when they sue former clients and seek whistleblow-
er protection. See, e.g., Burkhart v. Semitool, Inc., 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000); ABA Standing 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001) (opining that a former in-
house lawyer may pursue a wrongful discharge claim against a former employer and client as long 
as client information is properly protected). 
 116 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 773. 
 117 See John M. Barkett, Partner, Shook, Hardy & Bacon LLP, Paper Presented at the Ameri-
can Bar Association, Section of Litigation Annual CLE Conference: Lawyer-Client Fallout: Using 
Privileged Information to Establish a Claim or Defense Against a Client/Employer, at 5 (Apr. 
2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac2013/sac_
2013/38_the_ethics_of_lawyer_client.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/4BPK-98KE] (noting that 
most states have adopted the text of Model Rule 1.6(b)(5)); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(5). The earlier ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility included a 
similar exception, but it was narrower in scope, permitting disclosure only to establish or collect a 
fee. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4). 
 118 D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(e)(5); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.6(c)(5) (STATE BAR. OF MICH. 2015); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(5). 
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ing only information that is a “confidence” (i.e., the lawyer learned it through 
a privileged communication from the client) or a “secret” (i.e., the client spe-
cifically requested that it be kept confidential or disclosure of it would be det-
rimental to the client),119 or the broader standard, reaching all “information 
relating to the representation of a client.”120 Under the narrow formulation, 
information about a third party’s FCA violation would not even be covered by 
the confidentiality duty unless the client conveyed the information to the law-
yer in a confidential communication, the client specifically requested that it 
be kept confidential, or disclosure would be detrimental to the client.121 Under 
the broader formulation, the information is likely to be covered by the confi-
dentiality duty, and the confidentiality exceptions discussed above for client 
crimes and frauds and lawyer-client disputes would not apply because it is a 
third party—rather than a client—that is involved in the crime, fraud, or dis-
pute.122 The lawyer who wishes to disclose such information in an FCA law-
suit against a non-client third party would need to obtain the client’s informed 
consent before making the disclosure.123 
C. Lawyers’ Loyalty Obligations and the FCA 
Until recently, any discussion of ethical restrictions on a lawyer at-
tempting to take advantage of whistleblower bounties under the False 
Claims Act was confined to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, with no 
discussion of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty. In Holmes, however, a federal 
district court disqualified a lawyer-relator who took positions in an FCA 
lawsuit against a non-client third party that were in conflict with positions 
he was taking on behalf of a current client in separate litigation, despite the 
client’s manifested lack of objection to the lawyer’s conduct.124  And in 
FLPA I, a federal district court held that a partnership that included the 
company’s former General Counsel was barred from serving as a qui tam 
relator, regardless of whether the former lawyer had impermissibly dis-
closed confidential client information, because his role in the lawsuit impli-
                                                                                                                           
 119 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). 
 120 See, e.g., MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). This would reach information the 
lawyer learned in the course of representing a client. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 121 See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). 
 122 See, e.g., MO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). On the other hand, one state, Massa-
chusetts, permits disclosure in order to prevent a criminal or fraudulent act by a non-client. MASS. 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1) (MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. 2015). 
 123 See, e.g., Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *25–26. Unlike the confidentiality 
exceptions relating to client fraud, the exception for client consent does not vary significantly 
from state to state. 
 124 Id. at *31–32. 
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cated him in an impermissible conflict of interest with his former client in 
violation of the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility.125 
We begin by discussing a lawyer’s loyalty obligations to current clients and 
then consider a lawyer’s loyalty obligations to former clients. These loyalty 
obligations include disciplinary rules concerning conflicts of interest and 
keeping the client informed of developments material to the representation, 
as well as state fiduciary law that prohibits lawyers from financially profit-
ing as a result of using or disclosing confidential client information, even 
when the lawyer is ethically permitted to use or disclose the information for 
some other purpose. 
1. Loyalty Obligations to a Current Client 
The most glaring risk of a loyalty violation presumably would involve 
a lawyer-relator filing an FCA lawsuit against a current client. In all of the 
reported FCA cases involving a lawyer blowing the whistle on a client 
company, however, the lawyer had left the company before filing a qui tam 
complaint.126 It may be unlikely that a lawyer would file a qui tam lawsuit 
against a current client, particularly an employer: although the complaint is 
initially filed under seal, the company will learn that the lawyer has filed the 
complaint as soon as the seal is lifted, making it difficult for the lawyer to 
continue representing the company.127 Nevertheless, it is possible that a 
lawyer could file a qui tam complaint against a current client. Indeed in 
Doe, 128 the lawyer claimed that he was contemplating filing a qui tam ac-
tion against his employer and that he had clandestinely begun to copy con-
fidential documents before he was terminated, allegedly in response to his 
activity.129 Whether or not he would actually have filed the complaint while 
still employed by the company is unclear; however, it is certainly foreseea-
ble that a lawyer who is planning to leave, or believes that he or she might 
be terminated, will begin preparing for a subsequent qui tam filing, includ-
                                                                                                                           
 125 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *38. 
 126 See id. at *13; see also Stevens, 529 U.S. at 770; Repko I, 490 F. App’x at 503–04; Doe, 
862 F. Supp. at 1504; cf. Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *3 (lawsuit brought under 
the state version of the FCA). 
 127 Both state and federal anti-retaliation laws provide lawyers with a basis to argue that they 
are legally protected against retaliation for engaging in protected whistleblower activity. See infra 
notes 302–351 and accompanying text. The situation is quite different under Dodd-Frank, where 
the whistleblower is permitted to disclose information to the SEC anonymously, and the SEC may 
not reveal the whistleblower’s identity even after a whistleblower award is made. See infra notes 
242–301 and accompanying text. 
 128 X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1095–96. 
 129 Id. at 1096. The court rejected the lawyer’s retaliation claim and did not discuss any possi-
ble conflict of interest. Id. 
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ing locating and copying documents necessary to support the complaint. 
This preparation activity itself raises a conflicts issue concerning a current 
client.130 
Not all FCA cases involving lawyer-relators concern lawsuits against a 
client—whether current or former. Some involve lawyers who obtained in-
formation about a third party while representing a client, typically in a liti-
gation matter, and then used that information as the basis for filing a qui 
tam lawsuit against the third party.131 In most of these cases the courts did 
not mention any potential loyalty issue involving the client. In one case, the 
court briefly identified a potential conflict of interest, but even then, the 
reference was merely to indicate that dismissal of the lawyer-relator’s case 
on standing grounds worked “no ‘technical’ or unfair result.”132 In Holmes, 
the court readily identified a conflict of interest based on inconsistent posi-
tions the lawyer was taking in the FCA lawsuit against a third party and in 
related litigation involving the current client.133 In that case, the client told 
the Justice Department that it had no objection to the lawyer’s conduct, but 
the court found no evidence of the client’s informed consent.134 In other 
cases, the conflict of interest might be more subtle, and even when there is 
no conflict of interest, clients in future cases might well protest that the 
lawyer stole an opportunity that should have been presented to the client, 
thereby acting in violation of applicable ethical standards. 
a. Serving as a Qui Tam Relator Against a Current Client 
Although it is unusual, lawyers sometimes sue a current client; for ex-
ample, when a lawyer sues a client for unpaid legal fees135 or when an in-
house lawyer sues his or her employer for violating an anti-discrimination 
law.136 Thus, although unlikely, it is not inconceivable that a lawyer will file 
a qui tam complaint while still employed by the defendant company. In-
deed, anti-retaliation laws provide the lawyer with a basis to argue that, as 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See infra notes 135–169 and accompanying text. 
 131 See Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1996); Krein-
dler, 985 F.2d at 1150–52; Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *3–6; United States ex rel. 
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. (BCBS of Ga.), 
755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, 
P.A. v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. (Provident I), 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
 132 Fed. Recovery Servs., 72 F.3d at 453. 
 133 Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *14–16. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See, e.g., In re Simon, 20 A.3d 421 (N.J. 2011); In re Disciplinary Action Against Szymi-
alis, 557 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1997). 
 136 See, e.g., Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1986); St. John v. Emp’t Dev. 
Dep’t, 642 F.2d 273 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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disloyal as such an act may appear to the company, the lawyer is legally 
protected against retaliation for having filed the complaint.137 Does a lawyer 
who serves as a qui tam relator against a current client have an impermissi-
ble conflict of interest under state rules of professional conduct? For the 
purpose of addressing this question, we will assume that the lawyer has 
permission under state confidentiality rules to disclose the client’s infor-
mation in serving as a qui tam relator. 
Ordinarily, a lawyer-relator will have learned information concerning 
the client’s allegedly illegal conduct as a result of representing the client 
with respect to the subject matter of the qui tam lawsuit.138 If that represen-
tation is ongoing at the time the lawsuit is filed, then the lawyer almost cer-
tainly has a conflict of interest under Model Rule 1.7, in which a concurrent 
conflict exists whenever “there is a significant risk that the representation of 
one or more clients will be materially limited by . . . a personal interest of 
the lawyer.”139 Because the prospect of receiving a large sum of money 
“might tend to cloud a lawyer’s professional judgment,”140 such a risk is 
clearly present when the lawyer is simultaneously advising the company as 
to whether it is violating the law, whether the legal violation poses a threat 
to the company, or whether suspected wrongdoing should be reported to a 
higher level in the company, including the board of directors.141 Such a risk 
is also present when the lawyer is conducting or monitoring a compliance 
effort. All these activities require both an objective analysis of the compa-
ny’s legal obligations and an objective weighing of alternative courses of 
action available to the client, and it is difficult to expect objectivity from a 
lawyer who has filed a lawsuit in which the lawyer’s recovery depends on a 
finding that the client engaged in illegal conduct.142 
Under Model Rule 1.7(b), lawyers may accept or continue a represen-
tation burdened with a conflict of interest if the lawyer “reasonably believes 
that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See X Corp. II, 816 F. Supp. at 1095–96 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)). 
 138 Under the ABA Model Rules, the lawyer would not be permitted to use or disclose the 
information to prevent, mitigate, or rectify a client’s crime or fraud unless the client has used or is 
using the lawyer’s services in furtherance of the crime or fraud. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 1.6(b)(3); see supra notes 26–77 and accompanying text. 
 139 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2). 
 140 N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 10–11 (addressing concurrent conflicts under 
Dodd-Frank). 
 141 Cf. Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 8, at 21 (explaining that a lawyer who prematurely 
blows the whistle may harm the client because financial incentives place the lawyer’s personal 
interests in conflict with the client’s interests). 
 142 Cf. id. The size of the attorney’s recovery may depend on how long the illegal conduct 
continued, thereby giving the lawyer a financial incentive not to vigorously press the client to stop 
any illegal conduct. 
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to [the] client” and the client gives informed consent.143 If the potential 
award is large, it is probably unreasonable for the lawyer to believe that he 
or she would be able to provide “competent and diligent representation.”144 
But in any case, a lawyer-relator could not obtain a client’s informed con-
sent because the FCA prohibits the relator from disclosing the qui tam law-
suit until the case has been filed, the Justice Department has investigated, 
and the seal has been lifted.145 Of course, even if the lawyer could inform 
the client of the qui tam lawsuit, it is difficult to imagine a client permitting 
its lawyer to serve as a relator in an FCA lawsuit against the client. 
As a result, state conflict of interest rules—which, unlike confidentiali-
ty rules, do not vary significantly among jurisdictions—apparently prohibit 
a currently employed lawyer-relator from continuing to work on a matter 
that is the subject of the qui tam complaint. But perhaps the lawyer has 
ceased working on that matter or has requested reassignment after filing the 
qui tam lawsuit.146 Or perhaps the lawyer never represented the client on 
that matter, but learned of the illegality as a result of working on some other 
matter.147 Putting aside any possible duty to the employer as a former client 
(with respect to those matters on which the lawyer previously worked but is 
no longer working),148 does a lawyer owe a duty to a current client not to 
sue it, even in an unrelated matter? 
In addition to “material limitation” conflicts, Model Rule 1.7 also pro-
vides that a concurrent conflict exists whenever “the representation of one 
client will be directly adverse to another client” even when the matters are 
entirely unrelated.149 But this rule expressly applies only when the lawyer 
will be directly adverse to a client on behalf of another client, not on the 
lawyer’s own behalf. Arguably, lawyers should not be permitted to do di-
rectly, as parties, what they cannot do indirectly, as counsel for a party.150 If 
so, then lawyers would not be permitted to take directly adverse action 
against a current client on behalf of themselves when they could not do so 
on behalf of another client. This position is supported by a minority of state 
                                                                                                                           
 143 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1). 
 144 N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 11; Bruce A. Green & Jordan A. Thomas, Ap-
proaching Attorney Whistleblowing Post Dodd-Frank, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://
www.law360.com/articles/325874/approaching-attorney-whistleblowing-post-dodd-frank [http://perma.
cc/4ZEQ-7VEP]. 
 145 See supra notes 11–25 and accompanying text (discussing FCA claim procedures). 
 146 Cf. Green & Thomas, supra note 144. 
 147 The ABA Model Rules permit disclosure only if the client had used or was using the law-
yer’s services in furtherance of the crime or fraud, but some state rules permit disclosure without 
any such restriction. See supra notes 26–77 and accompanying text. 
 148 See infra notes 197–241 and accompanying text (discussing former-client conflicts). 
 149 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 150 See id.; see also FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *30–32. 
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rules that incorporate the former ABA Model Code’s provision that a lawyer 
may not “intentionally “[p]rejudice or damage his client during the course 
of the professional relationship [except when expressly permitted to do 
so].”151 But that broad proposition was not incorporated into the Model 
Rules that limit the lawyer’s duty of commitment and zeal to those matters 
for which the lawyer is actively representing the client.152 
In addition to Rule 1.7, Model Rule 1.8 addresses certain specific con-
flicts of interest with current clients. Rule 1.8(a) provides that “[a] lawyer 
shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire 
an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client” unless certain criteria are met, including obtaining the client’s in-
formed consent.153 The text of this rule would seem to prohibit a lawyer 
from serving as an FCA relator against a client. By filing an FCA lawsuit, a 
relator obtains a partial assignment of the government’s FCA claim against 
a defendant,154 thus arguably acquiring a “pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client.”155 And the FCA’s seal requirement prohibits a relator from obtaining 
the informed consent of the defendant.156 
Model Rule 1.8(a) is typically applied, however, to face-to-face trans-
actions between lawyers and their clients, even when the lawyer is not rep-
resenting the client in that transaction. Indeed, the first comment to Rule 
1.8(a) is captioned “Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer” and 
indicates that the purpose of the rule is to protect the client against the pos-
sibility of overreaching as a result of the “lawyer’s legal skill and training, 
together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and 
client.”157 There is no transaction between lawyer and client when a lawyer 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3(a)(2). 
 152 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable dili-
gence and promptness in representing a client.”); cf. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM 
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT § 55.05 illus. 55-1 (4th ed. 2015) (asserting that a lawyer serving on the board of a legal 
services organization that voted in favor of filing a class action against a bank represented by the 
lawyer would not violate Model Rule 1.7, but Model Rule 6.3 requires that lawyer to abstain from 
discussing or voting on the issue). 
 153 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (emphasis added). 
 154 See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 765–66. 
 155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a). Professor Anthony Sebok suggests that the 
use of the word “acquires” in the text of the rule would not clearly apply to an FCA relator: alt-
hough the relator has a pecuniary interest in the success of the qui tam lawsuit, the relator has not 
“acquired” that interest in the ordinary usage of that word. Anthony Sebok, Professor, Benjamin 
N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Comments at the Legal Ethics Scholars’ Roundtable (Oct. 31, 2014). 
 156  See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text (discussing 
Model Rule 1.7’s informed consent exception). 
 157 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) cmt. 1. None of the other comments 
applicable to 1.8(a) address a situation in which a lawyer acquires a pecuniary interest adverse to a 
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seeks a whistleblower bounty, and some may argue that the rule should not 
apply in this situation. If it does not, then lawyer conduct rules might not 
prohibit lawyers from seeking a whistleblower reward by filing a qui tam 
lawsuit against a current client, so long as the lawyer is not currently repre-
senting the client with respect to the subject matter of the lawsuit.158 
So far we have been positing a lawyer filing a qui tam lawsuit against 
a current client. What may be more likely, however, is that a lawyer who is 
planning to leave the company, either voluntarily or involuntarily, will re-
strict his or her activity to preparing to file a qui tam lawsuit; for example, 
by clandestinely gathering evidence of the company’s illegal conduct.159 
May a lawyer do so and avoid violating state professional conduct rules by 
waiting until leaving the company to actually file the complaint? 
If the lawyer is representing the client on the matter, then preparing to 
file a qui tam lawsuit almost certainly involves a conflict of interest for the 
lawyer, for the same reasons identified when the lawyer has actually filed 
the lawsuit. But when does the conflict arise? Does it arise when the lawyer 
begins gathering and copying documents? Would it make a difference if the 
lawyer is contemplating the filing of a lawsuit but has not yet made the de-
cision to do so, or does the mere contemplation of the filing of such a law-
suit create a material limitation conflict? It is conceivable that a lawyer who 
has been urging greater compliance efforts, perhaps even advising the client 
of the possibility of a qui tam lawsuit by other employees, will entertain the 
thought of filing such a lawsuit him or herself, particularly if the lawyer is 
concerned that a client is hostile to the lawyer’s advice and might fire the 
lawyer for continuing to press the matter. Must the lawyer then immediately 
withdraw from the representation or inform the client that he or she has 
considered the possibility of filing a qui tam lawsuit? We doubt that the 
mere possibility of the lawyer serving as a qui tam relator will constitute a 
“significant risk of a material limitation,”160 although the closer the lawyer 
comes to the decision to file (including a decision to file if and when the 
                                                                                                                           
client in a setting other than a transaction in which the client is involved. Courts have applied the 
rule to situations other than lawyer-client transactions in a few cases involving facts that support 
discipline under another rule. For example, ELLEN J. BENNETT ET AL., CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPON-
SIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 1.8 (8th ed. 2015) 
(citing cases). 
 158 If the lawyer previously represented the client with respect to the subject matter of the 
FCA lawsuit, then the former-client conflict rule may apply. See infra notes 197–241 and accom-
panying text. 
 159 This is precisely what the lawyer did in Doe. See 862 F. Supp. at 1504 (noting that “Doe 
took with him approximately 4300 copies of X Corp. documents and files” when he left X Corp.). 
 160 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1); supra notes 135–151 and accompa-
nying text. 
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lawyer is terminated or voluntarily leaves the company), and the more the 
lawyer does to prepare for such a filing, the more likely it is that the lawyer 
will be violating the current conflicts rule. 
In addition to conflict of interest rules, Model Rule 1.4 requires law-
yers to “keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter.”161 
As a result, lawyers who currently represent a company in a matter have a 
duty to inform the company if they are aware that a qui tam action has been 
or is going to be filed. But the FCA requires that the complaint be filed un-
der seal, which would prohibit a lawyer-relator from either providing the 
company with a copy of the complaint or informing it of the substance of 
the complaint. Thus lawyer-relators who comply with the FCA’s require-
ment of maintaining the confidentiality of the qui tam complaint will violate 
their ethical duties to the company under Model Rule 1.4. If, however, the 
lawyer never represented the company on a related matter, or has ceased 
representing the company on that matter, then there may be no obligation to 
inform the company, and the lawyer could comply with the qui tam seal 
requirements without violating this rule.162 
Finally, even when no disciplinary rule is violated, lawyers have com-
mon-law fiduciary duties that prohibit disloyalty to both current and former 
clients. Do lawyers violate their common-law fiduciary duties when they 
seek to profit from the use or disclosure of client information, even when 
the disclosure itself is permitted? Section 60(2) of the Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers prohibits such self-dealing: except with the 
client’s consent, “a lawyer who uses confidential information of a client for 
the lawyer’s pecuniary gain other than in the practice of law must account 
to the client for any profits made.”163 Comment j of section 60(2) makes 
clear that this fiduciary duty is broader than the prohibitions provided in 
lawyer disciplinary codes and is derived from the law of agency, under 
which an agent “has a duty to account for any profits made by the use of 
such [client] information,” even when the use “does not harm the princi-
                                                                                                                           
 161 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4. 
 162 See id. Lawyers are not generally required to keep former clients informed about post-
representation developments. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAW-
YERS § 33 cmt. h; see also Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 737, 782 (2003). Whether a lawyer has a duty to inform a current client of develop-
ments in an unrelated matter depends on “the client’s reasonable expectations; the scope, magni-
tude, and duration of the client-lawyer relationship; the evident significance of the information to 
the client; the burden on the lawyer in making the disclosure; and the likelihood that the client will 
receive the information from another source.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 33 cmt. h; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Coercing Clients: Can Lawyer Gatekeeper 
Rules Work?, 47 B.C. L. REV. 455 (2006) (discussing the complex and evolving nature of an at-
torney-client relationship). 
 163 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2). 
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pal.”164 Indeed, under the law of agency, the prohibition against self-dealing 
applies even when the information used “does not relate to the transaction 
in which he is then employed,”165 and even when the lawyer’s use or disclo-
sure of the information is not itself improper.166 The purpose of the prohibi-
tion is to prevent fiduciary agents from taking personal advantage of client 
information167 and to protect against risk to a principal’s interest that may 
arise when an agent pursues material benefits from third parties in connec-
tion with actions taken on behalf of the principal.168 Although the rule is not 
reflected in states’ current disciplinary rules,169 it appears that in seeking a 
whistleblower bounty under the FCA, lawyers violate their fiduciary duty 
not to personally profit at their clients’ expense. Indeed, unless the FCA 
preempts this fiduciary duty, it apparently precludes lawyers from ever serv-
ing as qui tam relators against their current or former clients, regardless of 
the circumstances and regardless of whether they are permitted to disclose 
adverse information under an exception to the confidentiality rule. 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Id. § 60 cmt. j (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 
1958)). The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides: 
Subsection (2) prohibits a lawyer from using or disclosing confidential client infor-
mation for the lawyer’s personal enrichment, regardless of lack of risk of prejudice 
to the affected client. The duty is removed by client consent . . . . The sole remedy of 
the client for breach of the duty is restitutionary relief in the form of disgorgement 
of profit (see Restatement Second, Agency § 388, Comment c) . . . . The strict con-
fidentiality duty of the Subsection is warranted for prophylactic purposes. A lawyer 
who acquires confidential client information as the result of a representation should 
not be tempted by expectation of profit to risk a possibly incorrect assessment of fu-
ture harm to a client. There is no important societal interest in permitting lawyers to 
make unconsented use or revelation of confidential client information for self-
enrichment in personal transactions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 8.02 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. e (“Even though the agent properly 
acquires and uses confidential information concerning his principal’s activities in the course of 
employment, he has a duty to account to the principal for any profits thereby made.”). 
 167 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) cmt. j. 
 168 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (discussing the “ordinary expectation 
that a person who acts as an agent does so to further the interests of the principal and that it is the 
principal who should benefit from turns of good fortune that may occur in connection with trans-
actions that the agent undertakes on the principal’s behalf”). 
 169 The failure of the Model Rules and state disciplinary rules to codify all of a lawyer’s fidu-
ciary duties is not inadvertent. There are many instances in which rule drafters make a deliberate 
choice to limit the types of conduct for which lawyers are subject to discipline, understanding that 
there are other avenues for enforcement of broader legal duties. 
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b. Serving as a Qui Tam Relator Against a Third Party 
Not all FCA cases involving lawyer-relators are lawsuits against either 
current or former clients. Some arise when lawyers obtain information 
about a third party while representing a client, typically in a litigation mat-
ter, and then use that information as the basis for a qui tam lawsuit against 
the third party. In only two of these cases did the court even mention a po-
tential conflict of interest involving the client,170 but we believe that a con-
flict of interest will often be present in these cases, either because the law-
yer’s personal interest in a potential qui tam award may affect the lawyer’s 
representation of the current client or because the lawyer has taken ad-
vantage of an economic opportunity that should have been presented to the 
client. 
In Holmes, the lawyer-relator obtained information about NGC while 
representing Munich Re, an insurer, in an arbitration proceeding with NGC, 
its insured.171 At the same time that Holmes was representing Munich Re in 
the arbitration, he filed an FCA complaint against NGC in which he alleged 
that NGC’s fraudulent conduct duped the government into paying funds to 
NGC as compensation for damages during Hurricane Katrina.172 The court 
found that this position conflicted with the position he took as counsel for 
Munich Re in the arbitration, in which Munich Re argued that it did not owe 
compensation to NGC for Katrina-related losses because the government 
had previously paid NGC for those losses.173 The court found a material 
limitation conflict of interest under ABA Model Rule 1.7, as well as the 
analogous rules in the District of Columbia and Mississippi.174 The court 
also rejected Holmes’s claim that he had obtained consent from Munich Re, 
finding that “the timing of Munich Re’s ‘consent’ [was] questionable and 
there [was] no evidence the consent was ‘informed.’”175 Although Munich 
Re was not complaining about Holmes’s conduct, NGC raised the conflict 
of interest as one of several bases for disqualifying Holmes from serving as 
relator and dismissing the complaint, and the court agreed.176 
Although the Holmes court readily found a conflict of interest based on 
the conflicting positions Holmes took in two separate proceedings, whether 
a conflict exists between a current client and a third-party FCA defendant 
will not always be obvious. To illustrate a more typical case, consider a se-
                                                                                                                           
 170 See Fed. Recovery Servs., 72 F.3d 447; Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804. 
 171 Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *3–4. 
 172 Id. at *4. 
 173 Id. at *18–19. 
 174 Id. at * 21. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at *17–22. 
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ries of cases involving a single law firm, Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Busta-
mante (“Stinson”) that represented a client who filed a personal injury law-
suit following an automobile accident.177 In the course of that representa-
tion, the law firm came to believe that the defendant’s insurance carrier, 
Provident, was filing claims in violation of federal law.178 When the insur-
ance carrier filed a declaratory judgment action against Stinson’s client, 
seeking to establish the legality of its claims practices, the law firm ob-
tained information in discovery revealing that other insurance companies 
were involved in similar claims processing.179 Ultimately, Stinson filed a 
series of qui tam lawsuits in six different federal district courts naming five 
different insurance companies as defendants. 
In none of the reported decisions involving the Stinson firm did any-
one raise the prospect that the Stinson lawyers may have had a conflict of 
interest concerning their decision to file as a qui tam relator in lawsuits 
against insurance companies that were engaged in illegal claims pro-
cessing.180 Under Model Rule 1.7, however, there would have been a con-
flict of interest if the lawyers’ personal interest in the qui tam lawsuit— 
against either Provident or the other insurers—presented a significant risk 
of materially limiting Stinson’s representation of its client. If Stinson filed a 
qui tam lawsuit against Provident prior to the conclusion of its client’s per-
sonal injury lawsuit, then there may well have been such a significant risk: 
Prudential’s consent was necessary to settle the lawsuit (including settling 
the case while any trial judgment was under appeal), and Provident could 
easily have been so offended by the FCA lawsuit that it would be disin-
clined to settle the client’s personal injury lawsuit against its insured on 
terms that were favorable to the client (and thereby to the law firm). There 
is perhaps less risk of material limitation with respect to an FCA lawsuit 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Provident Life & 
Accident Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Tenn. 1992); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Ger-
lin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 90-411, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7990 (E.D. 
La. May 22, 1992); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Pilot Life 
Ins. Co., No. C-90-29-G, 1991 WL 210855 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 1991); BCBS of Ga., 755 F. Supp. 
1040; United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 736 
F. Supp. 614 (D.N.J. 1990), aff’d, 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991); Provident I, 721 F. Supp. 1247. 
See generally Troy D. Chandler, Comment, Lawyer Turned Plaintiff: Law Firms and Lawyers as 
Relators Under the False Claims Act, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 541, 550–54 (1998–1999) (discussing 
three of the six cases). 
 178 See Provident I, 721 F. Supp. at 1248. 
 179 See Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1151. 
 180 This was probably because the law firm’s client was not a party to any of the lawsuits. It is 
unclear what a court would or should have done if the conflict had been raised by one of the de-
fendant companies. The primary issue raised in the reported opinions concerning the Stinson law-
suits was whether Stinson was an original source of the information upon which the qui tam com-
plaints were based. See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 177, at 550–54. 
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against the other insurers; however, even those lawsuits posed at least an 
indirect risk to Provident that could adversely affect the law firm’s represen-
tation of the personal injury plaintiff.181 Although it is unclear whether the 
other insurer defendants in the FCA lawsuit could raise such a conflict,182 it 
could certainly be used as the basis for either a subsequent disciplinary ac-
tion against the lawyer or a subsequent breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit 
brought by the personal injury client. 
Most conflicts arising under Model Rule 1.7 are consentable, and there 
is no obvious reason why a conflict arising under that rule in cases similar 
to those involving Holmes and Stinson could not be cured by obtaining the 
client’s informed consent. Does informed consent in such a case necessarily 
require advising the client that the client could serve as the qui tam relator? 
Arguably not, because whether the client might take advantage of this busi-
ness opportunity may have no bearing on any risk to the client of the lawyer 
continuing the representation with a personal interest conflict. But for the 
client’s “consent” to be “informed,” a lawyer must “communicate[] ade-
quate information” not just “about the material risks of . . . the proposed 
course of conduct,” but also “reasonably available alternatives.”183 Perhaps 
one of those alternatives is that the client could serve as the qui tam rela-
tor.184 
None of the courts deciding these qui tam lawsuits brought by lawyers 
against third parties has directly addressed a lawyer’s obligation to advise 
the client of the opportunity to serve as a qui tam relator. In 1996, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit came close to doing so in Federal 
                                                                                                                           
 181 Because Provident used the same allegedly fraudulent claims processing as the other in-
surers, it could anticipate subsequently being sued by another qui tam relator or by the government 
itself, even if the law firm had not filed a qui tam lawsuit against Provident. Provident might have 
been angry with Stinson for publicly airing the fraud allegations and therefore might be disin-
clined to enter into a favorable settlement with the personal injury client. 
 182 The Holmes court was not troubled by the fact that it was NGC and not Munich Re that 
was complaining about the conflict of interest between Holmes and Munich Re, but other courts 
have refused to disqualify a lawyer when the conflict does not adversely affect the complaining 
party. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (denying a motion to disqualify when the plaintiff made no effort to show its interests 
would be adversely affected by the law firm’s conflict); Gilbert v. Knoxville Int’l Energy Exposi-
tion, 547 F. Supp. 53, 54 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (denying a motion to disqualify when the complaining 
party failed to show any interest that could be adversely affected by the representation). 
 183 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0(e). 
 184 Model Rule 1.7 may not apply because any risk that the lawyer’s personal interest will 
affect the representation of the client is not significant. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7. 
Rule 1.4 requires the lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed concerning the representation, 
but it is unclear whether the scope of the “representation” as to which the client must be informed 
includes the opportunity to file a qui tam lawsuit against a third party. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4. 
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Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States.185 There, the law firm’s client, Pri-
ority E.M.S., Inc. (“Priority”), initially sued its competitor, Crescent City 
E.M.S., Inc. (“Crescent City”), for engaging in unfair trade practices by fil-
ing fraudulent claims with the federal government for reimbursement for 
ambulance services.186 The law firm and the President of Priority, Michael 
Boatright, incorporated Federal Recovery Services (“FRS”) for the express 
purpose of serving as a qui tam relator in a lawsuit against Crescent City 
under the FCA. 187  The law firm controlled a majority of the shares of 
FRS.188 The government intervened in the FCA case, settled with the de-
fendant, and agreed to pay Boatright ten percent of the settlement as rela-
tor’s share.189 But the government refused to pay the law firm any portion of 
the settlement, and the court refused to award it the attorney fees ordinarily 
awarded to lawyers of successful relators.190 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of FRS as a relator because the information had been publicly 
disclosed in earlier litigation; thus, FRS was not the “original source” for 
that information.191 Judge Patrick Higginbotham noted that “the attorneys 
bypassed a suit by Boatright, their client, in favor of an entity they con-
trolled,” and characterized their actions as an “overreach,” stating that the 
FCA “did not dispense with the tradition that a lawyer must represent his 
client’s interest, not his own.”192 Judge Higginbotham cited no authority for 
these statements, however, and did not explain how the law firm violated its 
obligation of loyalty to its clients.193 
In addition to Model Rule 1.7, Rule 1.8(b) provides that “[a] lawyer 
shall not use information relating to the representation of a client to the disad-
vantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as per-
mitted or required by these Rules.”194 In circumstances in which there is no 
significant risk that the qui tam lawsuit will harm the client, a lawyer-relator 
would not be using the information “to the disadvantage of the client,” unless 
deprivation of a business opportunity counts as such a disadvantage.195 Some 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Fed. Recovery Servs., 72 F.3d 447. 
 186 Id. at 448. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 450. 
 190 Id. at 449–50. 
 191 Id. at 450–52. The court also found that FRS could not “cure [the] jurisdictional defect by 
including or substituting Boatright” as an additional relator. Id. at 453. 
 192 Id. 
 193 See id. Judge Higgenbotham’s opinion assumes that the law firm represented both Priority 
and Boatright. See, e.g., id. at 452. Thus Priority may also have had an interest in serving as a qui 
tam relator against Crescent City. 
 194 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(b). 
 195 See id. 
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jurisdictions, however, more broadly prohibit use of a client’s confidential 
information to either the client’s disadvantage or to the advantage of the law-
yer or a third person, except with the client’s informed consent.196 Moreover, 
even in jurisdictions that follow the narrower Model Rule approach, the law-
yer’s common-law fiduciary duty not to engage in self-dealing requires the 
lawyer to account for any profits acquired through the use of client infor-
mation unless the client has consented to that use.197 Given that the use of the 
information will not be to the detriment of the client, and that the lawyer and 
client can work together to serve as qui tam relators, it is possible that a client 
will consent both to any conflict of interest and to the lawyer’s use of the cli-
ent’s information, thereby permitting the lawyer to serve as an FCA whistle-
blower against a third party defendant. 
2. Loyalty Obligations to Former Clients 
In FLPA I, a federal district court held that the company’s former coun-
sel was barred from serving as a qui tam relator, regardless of whether he 
had impermissibly disclosed confidential client information.198  This was 
because his role in the lawsuit implicated him in an impermissible conflict 
of interest with his former client, in violation of the New York Lawyer’s 
Code of Professional Responsibility.199 The then-applicable New York rule, 
which was essentially the same as Model Rule 1.9(a), provided: “[A] law-
yer who has represented a client in a matter shall not, without the consent of 
the former client after full disclosure . . . [t]hereafter represent another per-
son in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s in-
terests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client.”200  
FLPA had argued that the rule did not apply because neither FLPA nor 
the former General Counsel was acting as a lawyer representing a client in 
the qui tam lawsuit. The district court, however, agreed with the defendant 
company that it was sufficient for purposes of the conflicts rule that the 
                                                                                                                           
 196 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B). The District of Columbia, Mich-
igan, Texas, and Virginia have similar requirements. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.6(a)(2)–(3); MICH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(1)–(3); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 1.6(a); VA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (VA. STATE BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 197 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2). 
 198 See FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *40–41. 
 199 See id.; see also FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 167–68. The Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision that the lawyer-relator had violated state confidentiality rules, but because it did 
not need to do so, it did not consider whether the lawyer had also violated the former-client con-
flict rule. FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 165. 
 200 N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-108(A)(1) (N.Y. STATE BAR 
ASS’N 2007); see also FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *20–21; MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a). 
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former General Counsel, as an FLPA partner, was suing as a representative 
of the United States and not in his personal capacity.201 
In so holding, the court accepted two separate arguments made by the 
defendant. The first argument relied on a literal reading of the rule, which, 
like the Model Rule, applied to a lawyer “who represents another person” 
and did not expressly require that the representation be that of a lawyer rep-
resenting a client. In this regard, the court found that in a qui tam lawsuit, 
the qui tam relator “represents” the United States, relying both on the lan-
guage of the FCA and on prior case law holding that a qui tam relator sues 
as a representative of the United States. The United States “remains the real 
party in interest.”202 
The second argument accepted by the court was that the rule should 
not be interpreted in such a manner as to permit a former lawyer “to do di-
rectly, as a [representative] party, what he cannot do indirectly, as coun-
sel.”203 Here the court cited decisions holding that, although a lawyer may 
sue a former client to vindicate personal rights, a lawyer may not bring a 
shareholder derivative action or serve as a class representative in a lawsuit 
against a former client (in the same or a substantially related matter), be-
cause serving as a representative plaintiff “implicates considerations distinct 
from affording an attorney the opportunity to vindicate rights personal to 
him.”204 These decisions, according to the court, reflect the view taken by 
the defendant’s expert: that to refuse to apply the former-client conflicts 
rule to lawyers acting as a representative party would “destroy one of the 
policies behind the [rule]—to encourage clients to trust and be candid with 
counsel,”205 which the court viewed as “a cornerstone of the lawyer-client 
relationship.”206 
As the relator correctly noted, there was some precedent, contrary to 
the decisions cited by the court, holding that a lawyer who serves as a party 
representative does not violate the former-client conflicts rule. For example, 
in 2008, in Schaefer v. General Electric Co., a federal district court in Con-
                                                                                                                           
 201 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *24–35. 
 202 Id. at *25 (quoting Kreindler, 985 F.2d at 1154); see also United States ex rel. Rockefeller 
v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 15–16 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that a nonlawyer 
qui tam relator cannot proceed pro se because “[g]enerally, a lay person cannot represent a party 
in court,” and a qui tam relator “while having a stake in the lawsuit, represents the interests of the 
United States”). 
 203 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *24–35. 
 204 Id. at *28–29 (quoting Khanna v. McMinn, No. 20545-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, *125 
n.333 (May 9, 2006). 
 205 Id. at *29 (quoting Stephen Gillers, Professor of Law at New York University School of 
Law, who provided a declaration to the court regarding the ethics questions involved in the case). 
 206 Id. 
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necticut held that a former in-house lawyer could bring a Title VII sex dis-
crimination claim both in her individual capacity and on behalf of a class of 
similarly situated female executive employees and attorneys.207 The court 
summarily refused to apply the former-client conflicts rule because the 
plaintiff was not representing a client in the lawsuit.208 Instead, the court 
considered whether, under the particular circumstances of that case, it was 
likely that the lawyer would reveal more client confidences than were nec-
essary to establish her individual claim.209 Given that her individual allega-
tions were based on non-confidential and non-privileged information, and 
her class allegations would be proved through the use of statistical and per-
sonal information, the court concluded that disqualifying the lawyer from 
serving as a class representative was unwarranted.210 
Contrary to Schaefer, however, most courts have held that lawyers 
may not serve as a representative party in a shareholder derivative or class 
action lawsuit if they could not have represented a new client in the law-
suit.211 Nevertheless, regardless of whether these cases were correctly de-
cided, they are arguably distinguishable from situations in which the former 
lawyer seeks to serve as a qui tam relator. 
Many of the earlier shareholder derivative and class action cases were 
decided at a time when the disciplinary rules did not have a specific former-
client conflicts rule.212 Instead, courts developed the “substantial relation-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant at 19–22, FLPA II, 734 F.3d 154 (No. 
11-1565-cv) (citing Schaefer v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 3:07-CV-0858, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552, 
*3–4 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2008)): see also Bakerman v. Sidney Frank Importing Co., No. 1844-N, 
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 180, *42–43 (Oct. 10, 2006) (allowing a corporation’s former chief counsel 
to serve as a representative plaintiff in a derivative suit because he was actively excluded from the 
transaction at issue and there were no other co-plaintiffs to prosecute the action). 
 208 Schaefer, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552, at *36. The court did not address the fact that the 
rule does not expressly require that type of representation. See id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at *17–36. 
 211 In addition to the cases cited in the district court’s opinion in FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37014, at *27–30, there are a significant number of federal circuit court opinions directly 
on point. See generally Doe v. A Corp. (A Corp. I), 709 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1983) (barring former 
in-house counsel for the defendant corporation from prosecuting a class action but holding that he 
could prosecute the action on his own behalf); Richardson v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 
(3d Cir. 1972) (disqualifying former counsel for the defendant company from maintaining a class 
action and shareholder derivative suit against the company and certain officers and directors); Hall 
v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) (disqualifying the defendant’s former lawyer from serv-
ing as a class representative). 
 212 The federal circuit court cases cited above, supra note 211, were decided prior to or in the 
same year that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct were first adopted in 1983; thus 
none of them relied on Model Rule 1.9(a) or a state counterpart. For a discussion of the absence of 
a former-client conflict rule prior to the 1983 adoption of the Model Rules, see infra notes 215–
217 and accompanying text. 
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ship” test (subsequently codified in Model Rule 1.9(a) and its state counter-
parts) as part of a common law of lawyer disqualification designed to pre-
vent lawyers from impermissibly disclosing confidential client information 
of their former clients.213 With respect to lawyers bringing shareholder de-
rivative actions, there was presumably no confidentiality exception that 
would have permitted them to disclose confidential information in pursuit 
of the lawsuit; therefore, it was probably necessary to disqualify these law-
yers from acting as party-representatives in order to prevent them from vio-
lating their confidentiality obligations.214 As for lawyers attempting to serve 
as class action representatives, prior to the adoption of the Model Rules in 
1983, there was no confidentiality exception permitting disclosure in pursuit 
of the lawyer’s personal claim against a former client.215 Therefore, disqual-
ification of the lawyer was similarly necessary to protect the defendant’s 
confidential information. At least one court permitted a lawyer to pursue a 
personal claim against a former client, because there was no “social interest 
in allowing [the former client] to deny [the lawyer] . . . rights or . . . benefits 
if they are legally due him,” but nevertheless disqualified the lawyer from 
serving as a class representative because of the risk that he would disclose 
more information than was necessary in pursuit of his own claim.216 Prior to 
the FLPA decisions, no court had decided the disqualification question in 
the context of a lawyer representative such as a qui tam relator who was 
authorized to disclose a potentially wide range of client information under 
confidentiality exceptions designed to prevent or rectify former-client 
crimes or frauds.217 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 152, § 14.07; CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS 363 (1983). 
 214 See, e.g., Richardson, 469 F.2d at 1385–86 (disqualifying a lawyer from maintaining both 
a class action and a shareholder derivative suit because he may have acquired information in his 
prior employment that would be used in the present action). 
 215 See supra notes 11–25 and accompanying text; see also A Corp. I, 709 F.2d at 1047–48 
(barring the plaintiff from maintaining a class action but saying he could prosecute an action on 
his own behalf). 
 216 See, e.g., A. Corp. I, 709 F.2d at 1050. In contrast, the district court in Schaefer found that 
the lawyer’s individual allegations were based on non-confidential and non-privileged infor-
mation, and that her class action allegations would be proved through the use of statistical and 
personal information, thereby entailing no significant risk of abuse of the defendant company’s 
confidential information. See Schaefer, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552, at *36; see also Bakerman, 
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 180, at *34–35. 
 217 In Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, the court disqualified a lawyer from serving 
as a qui tam relator against his former employer on both confidentiality and conflict of interest 
grounds; however, unlike most other jurisdictions, California recognizes no exceptions to confi-
dentiality to prevent or rectify merely economic harm. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e)(2) 
(West 2004) (providing that the sole exception is to prevent a criminal act likely to result in death 
or substantial bodily harm). 
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In our view, it was not inevitable that the FLPA II court would decide 
that New York’s Rule 1.9(a) prohibits a lawyer from serving as an FCA re-
lator against a former client. Prior decisions disqualifying lawyers bringing 
shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits could have been viewed not 
as applying a disciplinary rule, but rather as applying a common law of 
lawyer disqualification,218 in which the courts were arguably assessing, on a 
case-by-case basis, the need to disqualify the lawyer to prevent likely 
breaches of the lawyer’s confidentiality obligation.219 
In support of this argument, the relator could have pointed out that, 
although the Model Rule on which the New York rule was based was not 
expressly limited to representation as a lawyer, this narrower interpretation 
may be what the rule drafters had in mind. Thus, the very first sentence in 
comment 1 of Model Rule 1.9 states that “[a]fter termination of a client-
lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to 
confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another 
client except in conformity with this Rule.”220 Indeed, the remainder of 
comment 1 of Model Rule 1.9 apparently assumes that the current represen-
tation involves a lawyer-client relationship, and most of the case law inter-
preting this and similar rules involves lawyers representing current clients 
in matters adverse to a former client.221 Moreover, the Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers specifically provides that, without the con-
sent of both clients, “a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter may 
not thereafter represent another client in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which the interests of the former client are materially adverse.”222 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See generally Keith Swisher, The Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71 (2014) (analyzing lawyer disqualification cases involving conflict of 
interest, appearance of impropriety, and misconduct). Even after the ABA promulgated a model 
former-client conflicts disciplinary rule in 1983, courts did not automatically apply that rule in 
determining whether to disqualify a lawyer; rather, they further developed the common law of 
disqualification, taking into account some considerations that do not apply in the disciplinary 
context. See id. at 80. 
 219 See supra notes 207–210 and accompanying text (referencing Schaefer and Bakerman, 
cases in which each court conducted an individual assessment of the likelihood of improper dis-
closure of confidential information). 
 220 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) cmt. 1 (emphasis added). The New York 
Code referenced in FLPA I did not have comments; even the current New York Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, which are based on the ABA Model Rules, do not have official comments. See 
ROY D. SIMON, SIMON’S NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ANNOTATED 2 (2014) 
(noting that only black-letter rules have been adopted by courts; comments are adopted only by 
the New York State Bar Association and are therefore explanatory, not binding). 
 221 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a) cmt. 1; BENNETT ET AL., supra note 
157, § 1.9 (citing several cases in which a lawyer attempted to represent a new client in a matter 
adverse to a former client). 
 222 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 (emphasis added). 
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None of the comments nor the reporter’s notes to this Restatement provision 
suggest any awareness that the rule as stated differs from Model Rule 
1.9(a).223 
As courts sometimes acknowledge, rules of professional conduct are 
not statutes enacted by a legislature. As a result, courts have often felt more 
at liberty to interpret these rules (unlike statutes) in a way that advances the 
court’s own understanding of the purposes underlying the rules, taking into 
account other law that is or may be applicable to lawyers. Thus, the FLPA I 
court concluded that the former-client conflict rule should be interpreted to 
apply to any instance in which a lawyer acts in a representative capacity, on 
the ground that lawyers should not be able to do directly as parties what 
they cannot do indirectly in representing a client.224 On the contrary, the 
relator in FLPA I had argued that the spirit of the rules as a whole would not 
be violated if lawyers were permitted to sue as qui tam relators, so long as 
they do not disclose more information than is necessary to prevent or rectify 
the former client’s crime or fraud.225 This argument might be rephrased to 
urge that respect for the federal interests underlying the FCA requires courts 
to follow the admonition of the federal district court in Doe that “to the ex-
tent that state law permits a disclosure of client confidences, such as to pre-
vent a future or ongoing crime or fraud, then the attorney’s use of the qui 
tam mechanism to expose that fraud should be encouraged, not deterred.”226 
Which view better reflects the differing policies underlying both the 
rules of professional conduct and the False Claims Act?227 To answer this 
question, it is first necessary to understand the policies underlying the for-
mer-client conflicts rule under Model Rule 1.9(a) and its state counterparts, 
as well as the common law of lawyer disqualification, in core cases involv-
ing the representation of a new client adverse to a former client in the same 
or a substantially related matter. 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See id. cmts. a–j & reporter’s notes. 
 224 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *27–30 (finding that the New York Code equiv-
alent of Model Rule 1.9(a) does not permit a former attorney “to do directly, as a party, what he 
could not do indirectly, as counsel”). 
 225 See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 26–31. 
 226 See Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507–08; supra note 47 and accompanying text. The company in 
Doe based its argument for disqualification solely on confidentiality and never raised the former-
client conflicts rule. Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1503. Virginia had not yet adopted a version of the 
Model Rules, and its ethics code did not specifically address former-client conflicts. See generally 
VA. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (VA. STATE BAR ASS’N 1983) (lacking a former-clients 
conflict rule). 
 227 We do not mean here to address the question of federal preemption of state disciplinary 
codes, which we address in Part III. Rather, what we are suggesting here is that when courts are 
interpreting a disciplinary code provision, they may and should consider the context in which the 
interpretive issue is raised. 
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Although there are some differences in the application of the former-
client conflicts rule, it is generally agreed that, in these core cases, lawyers 
may not avoid disqualification by attempting to establish either that they 
have no confidential information of the former client that would be of use to 
the new client or that, even if they have such information, they will not im-
permissibly disclose it. Rather, courts use the “substantial relationship” test 
to identify situations in which it is likely that the lawyer had access to con-
fidential information of the former client that would be of use to the new 
client.228 In such situations, courts presume that there is a sufficient threat to 
the impermissible use of confidential client information of the former client 
that the lawyer must be prevented from undertaking the new representa-
tion.229 This presumption is irrebuttable, because to allow it to be rebutted 
would force the client to reveal the very information that it wishes to keep 
confidential and would put the parties in the awkward position of debating 
whether this particular lawyer is capable of adhering to his or her confiden-
tiality obligations.230 
The rationale for presumptive disqualification appears to be the need 
for prophylactic rules that prevent a lawyer from impermissibly using or 
disclosing a former client’s confidential information. Therefore, would-be 
lawyer-relators will argue that when they are permitted to use or disclose a 
former client’s confidential information in order to prevent or rectify the 
former client’s crime or fraud, there is no reason to prevent them from act-
ing adversely to the former client in a substantially related matter.231 As a 
result, the former-client conflicts rule should not be interpreted to apply to 
such qui tam relators (or, regardless of how the disciplinary rule is inter-
preted, these lawyers should not be disqualified from serving as qui tam 
relators).  
There are two possible responses to this argument. The first response is 
that prophylactic disqualification of the lawyer might still be necessary to 
ensure that the lawyer uses or discloses only that information that is neces-
sary to prevent or rectify the former client’s crime or fraud. In other words, 
although the lawyer might be free to disclose information to the government 
                                                                                                                           
 228 See, e.g., 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 152, § 14.07. 
 229 See id. 
 230 See id. There is an additional concern that a lawyer will be restricted in the representation 
of a current client. But this concern is relevant to determining the lawyer’s obligations under 
Model Rule 1.7, not under Rule 1.9(a), the latter being designed to protect the interests of the 
former client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.7, 1.9(a). 
 231 Cf. Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115 (Cal. 2011) (sustaining a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against a lawyer who in his personal capacity publicly protested a develop-
ment permit that he himself had formerly obtained on behalf of the client, and declining to limit 
precedents to situations involving the successive representation of clients). 
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(without attempting to serve as a qui tam relator), permitting the lawyer to 
serve as a qui tam relator provides too great an incentive for the lawyer to 
use or disclose more information than would be permitted under the appli-
cable exception to the confidentiality rule. 
This response is weak because it insufficiently acknowledges the ex-
istence of important interests other than those of the former client. Even in 
core cases involving representation of a current client adverse to a former 
client in a substantially related matter, it is understood that the substantial 
relationship test is underinclusive and will not identify all cases in which 
the lawyer has confidential information from the former client that could be 
useful to the new client in pursuing the current litigation.232 Nevertheless, 
neither Model Rule 1.9(a) nor the common law of disqualification prohibits 
lawyers from representing current clients adverse to their former clients in 
situations in which there is merely a remote possibility that the lawyer has 
obtained relevant information. 233  Rather, prophylactic disqualification is 
limited to the same or a substantially related matter in order to avoid unduly 
burdening the current client’s interest in hiring counsel of choice, as well as 
the lawyer’s legitimate interest in taking on new clients and new matters in 
furtherance of the lawyer’s career.234 When the matters are not the same or 
substantially related, courts trust lawyers to adhere to their confidentiality 
obligations to their former clients by identifying situations in which confi-
dential information is at risk and then either voluntarily declining the new 
matter or taking care to avoid impermissibly using or disclosing such in-
formation in the course of the current representation. Similarly, given that 
there may be much information that qui tam relators are permitted to dis-
close in prosecuting the qui tam lawsuit, courts should trust them not to dis-
close more information than is permitted under the applicable confidentiali-
ty exception: to do otherwise would insufficiently acknowledge the federal 
interest in having insiders with relevant information blow the whistle on 
companies that have defrauded the federal government. And if the lawyer 
does disclose information unnecessarily, then the lawyer is still subject to 
discipline for breaching the obligation of confidentiality. 
A second response to arguments favoring a narrow interpretation of 
Model Rule 1.9(a) is perhaps more compelling. The substantial relationship 
test is a prophylactic standard aimed primarily at protecting the former cli-
                                                                                                                           
 232 See, e.g., 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 152, § 14.07 (stating that it is insufficient that 
the lawyer for a client in one matter “could have” obtained confidential information about the 
other). 
 233 See id. 
 234 Cf. id. (“It is unfair to the lawyer and to the lawyer’s new client for a former client to be 
able to paint an overly broad picture of the prior representation without fear of contradiction.”). 
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ent’s confidential information; however, in addressing subsequent adverse 
representation, some courts have focused not just on this confidentiality 
concern, but also on the lawyer’s duty of loyalty.235 Most courts, however, 
limit the independent role of loyalty under state versions of Rule 1.9(a) to 
several narrow situations; for example, those involving an attack on the 
lawyer’s own work for the former client and those involving former clients 
who were jointly represented, where there is typically no expectation of 
confidentiality between the clients.236 In both instances, the purpose of the 
prohibition on subsequent adverse representation is to prevent the lawyer 
from acting improperly in the earlier representation. For example, if the 
former-client conflicts rule did not apply to attacks on a lawyer’s own prior 
work product, then a lawyer might draft documents that are susceptible to a 
later challenge, thereby creating the potential for lucrative work on behalf 
of a new client. Even if such traps were laid inadvertently, clients should be 
assured that the lawyer will not be permitted to exploit them on behalf of a 
new client.237 Similarly, and perhaps even more compellingly, if a lawyer is 
permitted to proceed adversely to a former joint client, then the lawyer 
would have an incentive to impermissibly favor the other client during the 
period of the common representation, particularly if the common represen-
tation is about to end.238 In both situations, the purpose of prohibiting sub-
sequent representation is to neutralize the risk of disloyalty during the earli-
er representation. 
With respect to lawyers serving as qui tam relators, it may be neces-
sary or desirable to prevent them from subsequently “representing” the gov-
ernment in matters substantially related to work they performed for their 
former client in order to ensure against disloyalty during the period that the 
lawyer is representing the company.239 For example, while employed by the 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See Charles W. Wolfram, Symposium, Former-Client Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
677, 691–712 (1997) (noting that “some courts and commentators also take the position that an 
analytically separate and important consideration in determining the scope of the former-client 
conflict rules is that of loyalty”; also criticizing the appeal to loyalty concerns except in several 
specific instances); see also Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *11. In Bury, the court 
stated: 
It is . . . an attorney’s duty to protect his or her client in every possible way. An at-
torney violates this duty of loyalty if he or she assumes a position adverse or antag-
onistic to a client without the client’s free and intelligent consent. The duties of con-
fidentiality and of loyalty are owed to former as well as present clients. 
Bury, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035, at *11 (citations omitted). 
 236 Wolfram, supra note 235, at 696–712. 
 237 Id. at 697–98. 
 238 Id. at 711. 
 239 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 13–14. Another rationale was expressed 
in a recent opinion by the New York County Lawyers’ Association’s Committee on Professional 
 
2015] Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers 1741 
company, a lawyer may be advising its officers whether the company is vio-
lating its legal obligations to the government, whether a legal violation pos-
es a substantial threat to the company, or whether credible evidence of 
wrongdoing should be reported to a higher level in the company (such as to 
the board of directors).240 A lawyer who has the option of leaving the com-
pany (either voluntarily or involuntarily) and then filing a qui tam lawsuit 
against the company could easily be tempted to act in a manner that would 
make that lawsuit more likely to succeed. Preventing this from occurring 
could justify either interpreting the former-client conflicts rule to cover sub-
sequent “representation” by a qui tam relator or disqualifying the lawyer-
relator regardless of whether the former-client conflicts rule expressly ap-
plies. 
If Model Rule 1.9(a) precludes lawyers from filing a qui tam lawsuit 
against a former client, then other potential loyalty obligations are clearly 
moot. But there is a good chance that courts will ultimately decide that Rule 
1.9(a) does not apply because qui tam relators do not “represent” the gov-
ernment in the sense intended under the rule. In that case, we should also 
consider whether the lawyer has other applicable loyalty obligations. As we 
discussed previously, lawyers have a duty under Model Rule 1.4 to keep 
their current clients informed of significant developments in the representa-
tion; however, the rule does not generally apply to former clients.241 The 
prohibition on self-dealing, however, continues even after a representation 
has ended. As with a current client, this common-law duty appears to broad-
ly prohibit a lawyer from serving as a qui tam relator, even against a former 
client, unless federal law preempts the common-law duty. 
                                                                                                                           
Ethics with respect to whistleblower bounties under Dodd-Frank. Id. After noting that a disclosure 
is not permitted under confidentiality exceptions to the New York Rules of Professional Conduct 
unless it is “reasonably necessary,” the Committee concluded that: 
[U]ndertaking this otherwise permissible disclosure in a manner that results in a 
bounty for the lawyer raises a significant risk that the attorney’s judgment in deter-
mining whether the disclosure is “reasonably necessary” will be adversely affected 
and presents a conflict of interest that is beyond what Rule 1.9 was intended to al-
low. 
Id. at 14. Interestingly, the opinion does not mention New York Rule 1.9(a), the former-client 
conflicts rule that was expressly addressed in the district court’s decision in FLPA I. It would be 
difficult to extend the rationale of FLPA I to whistleblower bounties under Dodd-Frank because 
there is no sense in which the Dodd-Frank whistleblower acts in a representative capacity, as is the 
case under the FCA. See infra notes 296–301 and accompanying text. 
 240 See, e.g., N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 10; Temkin & Moskovits, supra 
note 8, at 14. 
 241 See supra notes 26–123 and accompanying text. 
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II. SEC WHISTLEBLOWER AWARDS UNDER DODD-FRANK 
A. Primer on Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Awards 
Dodd-Frank requires the SEC to give financial awards to whistleblow-
ers who provide it with information that results in successful enforcement 
actions.242 Under this statute, if a whistleblower gives the SEC “original 
information,” and the SEC brings an enforcement action that yields mone-
tary sanctions greater than $1 million, then the SEC must pay the whistle-
blower between 10–30% of the sanction amount.243 The statute excludes 
five categories of individuals from these whistleblower awards: (1) employ-
ees of certain government agencies; (2) employees of self-regulatory organ-
izations; (3) anyone convicted of a crime related to the enforcement action; 
(4) anyone who knowingly and willfully provides false information; and (5) 
anyone who learned the information through the performance of a statutori-
ly required audit.244 
The SEC’s Dodd-Frank whistleblower regulations identify the gov-
ernment agencies and self-regulatory organizations whose employees are 
excluded from the program.245 These regulations also identify additional 
categories of individuals and information that are excluded from the whis-
tleblower award program, including SEC employees’ family members, any-
one who provides information in response to a subpoena, and anyone who 
obtained the information by means that a court has determined were unlaw-
ful.246 The regulations permit a person involved with a corporation’s com-
pliance function to qualify for a whistleblower award if he or she reported it 
internally at least 120 days prior to reporting it to the SEC.247 
The SEC’s whistleblower award process has several distinct stages. 
First, the whistleblower must submit information about the alleged violation 
                                                                                                                           
 242 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). Dodd-Frank authorized a 
similar program administered by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”). 
See id. § 748, 124 Stat at 1380; 17 C.F.R. § 165.1 (2011). As of this writing, the CFTC has issued 
two whistleblower awards: one for $240,000 and another for $290,000. Press Release No. 7254-
15, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC to Issue Whistleblower Award of Approx-
imately $290,000 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7254-15 
[http://perma.cc/WQK6-JVLZ]; Press Release No. 6933-14, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, CFTC Issues First Whistleblower Award (May 20, 2014), http://www.cftc.gov/Press
Room/PressReleases/pr6933-14 [http://perma.cc/BK5H-AL5H] (announcing first whistleblower 
award, which was approximately $240,000). 
 243 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(i). 
 244 Id. § 78u-6. 
 245 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(1) (2011). 
 246 Id. § 240.21F-8(c)(3)–(7). 
 247 Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(c). 
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by filling out a specific form.248 Second, the SEC investigates the allega-
tion.249 If that investigation leads to an enforcement action and if that en-
forcement action results in sanctions over $1 million, then the whistleblow-
er may apply for an award.250 Every few months, the SEC publishes a list of 
all of its enforcement actions that have resulted in sanctions over $1 million 
(including those resulting from whistleblower tips and those resulting from 
other sources).251 At that point, a whistleblower has ninety days to claim a 
whistleblower award by filling out another form, an Application for 
Award.252 The SEC determines whether the whistleblower is eligible for an 
award, and, if eligible, the amount of the award.253 If the SEC denies an 
award or grants an award less than the statutory ten percent minimum, then 
the whistleblower can appeal that determination to a federal circuit court.254 
The program is still in its infancy because it takes time for a whistle-
blower case to percolate through the SEC’s investigative and administrative 
processes. In the few years since the SEC issued regulations implementing 
the statute, the agency has received about 3000 whistleblower tips per year 
and has paid more than $54 million to twenty-two whistleblowers, includ-
ing one award for more than $30 million.255 
Unlike the FCA, which requires whistleblowers to publicly identify 
themselves and thus risk retaliation, the SEC’s Dodd-Frank program allows 
whistleblowers to keep their identity secret.256 The statute permits whistle-
blowers to submit tips anonymously as long as they do so through an attor-
                                                                                                                           
 248 Id. § 240.21F-9(a). The form asks questions about the individual’s potential eligibility for 
a whistleblower award, including whether the individual is or was the entity’s counsel, and wheth-
er any of the information “was obtained from an attorney or in a communication where an attorney 
was present.” Form TCR: Tip, Complaint or Referral, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (2011), https://
www.sec.gov/about/forms/formtcr.pdf [http://perma.cc/6EXG-E7RR] (see questions 5a and 10). 
 249 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d). 
 250 Id. § 240.21F-10(a). 
 251 Id. 
 252 Id.; see also id. § 240.21F-10(b) (referring to “Form WB–APP, Application for Award for 
Original Information Provided Pursuant to Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”). 
 253 Id. § 240.21F-10(d). 
 254 Id. § 240.21F-13(a). 
 255  SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK 
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 10, 20 (2014), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-
2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/KLE9-FVD4]; Press Release No. 2015-252, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 
SEC Announces Whistleblower Award of More Than $325,000 (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-252.html [https://perma.cc/GH6U-N6XQ?type=source]. 
 256 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (stating that “the Commission shall not disclose any in-
formation, including information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could 
reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower” except in several limited circum-
stances). 
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ney.257 To claim an award, a whistleblower needs to reveal his or her identi-
ty to the SEC,258 but the statute prohibits the SEC from “disclos[ing] any 
information . . . which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of 
a whistleblower.”259 
When the SEC announces that it has made a whistleblower award, it 
describes the facts leading to the award in such generic terms that it is usu-
ally impossible to identify the company involved (let alone the whistle-
blower).260 Thus, in the limited history of the SEC’s Dodd-Frank whistle-
blower program, the SEC has taken seriously its statutory mandate to pro-
tect the identity of whistleblowers. Because of the secrecy surrounding the 
SEC’s whistleblower program, we simply do not know whether any of its 
awards have gone to lawyers. 
If a company learned that its current or former lawyer disclosed its al-
leged wrongdoing to the government and is seeking a financial award for 
doing so, the company could be expected to object on grounds of confiden-
tiality or loyalty.261 But under Dodd-Frank, a company may never find out. 
The entire process takes place in secret within an administrative agency. 
Although a whistleblower could seek judicial review if the SEC denies an 
award entirely or grants an award that is less than ten percent of the sanc-
tions, it is not clear that a client company will ever be in a position to seek 
judicial review of an SEC award to a lawyer-whistleblower (or any other 
kind of whistleblower, for that matter). Nevertheless, we expect that the 
SEC will abide by its own mandate not to grant awards where a lawyer’s 
disclosures go beyond that permitted by state confidentiality rules or the 
SOX regulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 257 Id. § 78u-6(d)(2)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(b) (indicating that the attorney must know the 
whistleblower’s identity). 
 258 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d)(2)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(b)(3). 
 259 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(a). 
 260 See, e.g., In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with [Undisclosed Party]: 
Notice of Covered Action 2012, Exchange Act Release No. 67,699 (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.
sec.gov/rules/other/2012/34-67699.pdf [http://perma.cc/7SXD-XVYH] (denying the claimant’s 
application for a whistleblower award). 
 261 In the four FCA cases involving lawyer-relators who blew the whistle on their former 
private-sector clients, the former clients did object and ultimately prevented the lawyers from 
collecting a whistleblower award. United States ex rel. Repko v. Guthrie Clinic, P.C., 490 
F. App’x 502, 503–05 (3d Cir. 2012); United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest 
Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA I), No. 05-Civ.-5393 (RPP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 24, 2011), aff’d, 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013); United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. (Doe), 
862 F. Supp. 1502 (E.D. Va. 1994); Bury v. Cmty. Hosps. of Cent. Cal., No. F036667, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1035 (May 8, 2002).  
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B. Lawyers’ Confidentiality Obligations and Dodd-Frank  
Whistleblower Awards 
The Dodd-Frank statute indicates that whistleblower awards are avail-
able to individuals who provide the SEC with “original information” that 
leads to a successful enforcement action.262 Although the statute excludes 
several classes of individuals from being eligible for these awards,263 it does 
not address whether lawyers are eligible or whether lawyers seeking such 
awards may reveal otherwise confidential information. The SEC regulation 
defining “original information” does exclude certain types of information 
from becoming the basis for an award, including information obtained from 
communications subject to the attorney-client privilege264 or obtained in 
connection with legal representation.265 This regulation would ordinarily 
prevent lawyers from obtaining whistleblower awards for disclosing their 
clients’ securities violations. But what the regulation takes away with one 
hand, it partially gives back with another: information that is privileged or 
obtained in connection with legal representation may nonetheless form the 
basis of an award if a lawyer would be permitted to disclose that infor-
mation under applicable state attorney conduct rules, under the SEC’s earli-
er SOX regulation, or otherwise.266 For lawyers who are potential whistle-
blowers, this is perhaps the most important feature of the SEC’s Dodd-
Frank whistleblower program: the fact that it incorporates the SEC’s SOX 
regulation, which creates new confidentiality exceptions for lawyers prac-
ticing before the SEC.267 
In issuing its Dodd-Frank whistleblower regulation, the SEC asserted 
that the regulation “strikes the right balance because” it is “consistent with 
the public policy judgments” in its earlier SOX regulation “as to when the 
benefits of permitting disclosure are justified notwithstanding any potential 
harm to the attorney-client relationship.”268 Because the SEC’s Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower regulation incorporates the earlier SOX regulation, it is nec-
essary to examine the SOX regulation’s confidentiality exceptions in some 
detail. 
                                                                                                                           
 262 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1). 
 263 Id. § 78u-6(c)(2). The statute excludes several categories of individuals from receiving 
whistleblower awards, including employees of the Justice Department and law enforcement organ-
izations. Id. 
 264 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i). 
 265 Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(ii). 
 266 Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)–(ii). 
 267 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2003). The SOX regulation also expressly preempted contrary 
state ethics rules. See infra notes 338–351 and accompanying text. 
 268 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Exchange Act Release No. 64,545, 
76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,315 n.133 (June 13, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249). 
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Section 307 of the SOX Act required the SEC to “issue rules . . . set-
ting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appear-
ing and practicing before the Commission.”269 The statute specified that the 
SEC’s regulation must “includ[e] a rule” requiring that lawyers with “evi-
dence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty” 
must engage in internal whistleblowing, ensuring that a corporation’s lead-
ership would be aware of that evidence.270 In response to that statute, the 
SEC issued a regulation requiring such a lawyer to engage in internal whis-
tleblowing if the lawyer is aware of “credible evidence” that it is “reasona-
bly likely that a material violation” of securities law or a material breach of 
a fiduciary duty has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.271 This man-
date for internal whistleblowing is similar to that found in ABA Model Rule 
1.13(b), but it has a lower evidentiary trigger: credible evidence of a rea-
sonably likely violation, rather than 1.13(b)’s knowledge of a violation.272 
The regulation also included several additional provisions that were “not 
explicitly required by Section 307, but which the Commission believe[d] 
[were] important components of an effective ‘up the ladder’ reporting sys-
tem.”273 One of those additional provisions created new confidentiality ex-
ceptions for lawyers practicing before the SEC, allowing them to disclose 
information to the SEC “to the extent the attorney reasonably believes nec-
essary” to “prevent the issuer from committing a material violation” or to 
“rectify the consequences of” the issuer’s past “material violation . . . that 
caused, or may cause, substantial injury to the financial interest or property 
of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which the attorney’s services 
were used.”274 
                                                                                                                           
 269 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (2002) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012)). 
 270 Id. 
 271 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e) (defining “evidence of a material violation”); id. § 205.2(i) (defining 
“material violation”); id. § 205.3(b) (providing the mandate for internal whistleblowing). The 
proposed rule also included several other provisions that the SEC omitted from its final rule, in-
cluding provisions requiring lawyers to notify the SEC of a client’s material violations. See, e.g., 
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 
8150, Exchange Act Release No. 46,868, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 71,670, 71,705 (proposed Dec. 2, 2002) (proposing 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3), (d)). 
 272 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 273  Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 67 Fed. Reg. at 
71,673. 
 274 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii). It is this provision—allowing lawyers to disclose information to 
rectify a client’s fraud—that is likely to be most relevant to lawyers seeking Dodd-Frank whistle-
blower awards. The evidentiary trigger permitting external whistleblowing is higher than that man-
dating internal whistleblowing. External whistleblowing is permissible only if the lawyer “reasonably 
believes” that the disclosure is necessary in order to prevent or rectify a violation—a standard similar 
to that found in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3). Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
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The SOX regulation’s confidentiality exceptions are, at the highest 
level of generality, similar to the fraud-related exceptions found in the 
Model Rules and most states’ rules.275 The confidentiality exceptions in 
both are triggered if the lawyer “reasonably believes” that disclosure is 
“necessary” in order to prevent or rectify certain violations.276 But at a more 
granular level, the differences are significant and the SOX exceptions are 
generally broader in scope. Instead of being limited to crimes and frauds, 
the SOX exceptions reach “material violations” of federal or state securities 
law and material breaches of fiduciary duty.277 Unlike Model Rule 1.6, the 
SOX regulation permits lawyers to disclose in order to prevent a violation 
even if the lawyer’s services were not used in that violation.278 It permits 
lawyers to disclose in order to rectify a past violation or breach when their 
services were used in furtherance of the violation or breach,279 even if it is 
the issuer (rather than a third party) that is injured by the violation.280 
The SEC’s SOX regulation does not apply to all lawyers. Instead it ap-
plies to (and can be invoked by) lawyers “[a]ppearing and practicing before 
the” SEC.281 This phrase—“[a]ppearing and practicing”—reaches not just 
lawyers who “appear” in the traditional sense of “[r]epresenting an issuer in 
a Commission administrative proceeding,”282 but also lawyers who provide 
advice about whether information must be submitted to the SEC283 or ad-
vice about the adequacy of any document submitted,284 as well as any law-
yer “[t]ransacting any business with the [SEC], including communications 
in any form.”285 It has been suggested that when a whistleblowing lawyer 
makes a disclosure to the SEC in order to later qualify for an award, that 
                                                                                                                           
DUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3). Internal whistleblowing is mandated when “it is reasonably likely that a mate-
rial violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(e). 
 275 Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919, 
68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6311 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205) (stating that “the vast ma-
jority of states already permit (and some even require) disclosure of information in the limited 
situations covered by” the SOX confidentiality exceptions). But see LATHAM & WATKINS, supra 
note 90, at 6, 10–15 (reviewing the rules of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, and char-
acterizing the SEC’s statement as “an exaggeration”). 
 276 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b). 
 277 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i). 
 278 Id. § 205.3(d)(2)(i). 
 279 Id. § 205.3(d)(2)(iii). 
 280 Id.; cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3) (referring to “substantial inju-
ry to the financial interests or property of another”). 
 281 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a). 
 282 Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(ii). 
 283 Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(iv). 
 284 Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(iii).  
 285 Id. § 205.2(a)(1)(i). 
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disclosure constitutes a “communication” that qualifies the lawyer as “ap-
pearing and practicing” before the SEC, making broad SOX confidentiality 
exceptions applicable. But a lawyer’s communication with the SEC consti-
tutes “appearing and practicing” only if it occurs “in the context of provid-
ing legal services to an issuer with whom the attorney has an attorney-client 
relationship.”286 If the disclosure is for the purpose of qualifying for a whis-
tleblowing award, it would be outside “the context of providing legal ser-
vices to an issuer,” and therefore this bootstrapping approach would not be 
available. 
In the context of FCA-related disclosures, a lawyer’s ability to disclose 
information largely depends on whether the applicable state confidentiality 
rule permits disclosure to rectify, mitigate, or prevent client frauds and 
crimes, or prohibits such disclosures entirely. In the context of Dodd-Frank, 
any lawyer who appears and practices before the SEC can avail him or her-
self of the expanded confidentiality exceptions found in the SOX regula-
tion—and therefore may inform the SEC of material securities law viola-
tions and material breaches of fiduciary duty even if the applicable state 
confidentiality rule would prohibit such a disclosure. But the key question 
under Dodd-Frank is whether the lawyer who wishes to use the SOX excep-
tions is actually subject to the SOX regulation. 
C. Lawyers’ Loyalty Obligations and Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Awards 
1. Current Clients 
No court has yet addressed the issue of the ethical propriety of lawyers 
seeking whistleblower bounties under the Dodd-Frank legislation. Various 
commentators287 and at least one bar ethics committee,288 however, have 
addressed the applicability of state confidentiality and/or conflicts rules un-
der the SEC regulations implementing the Dodd-Frank whistleblower boun-
ty provisions. Regarding conflicts of interest, most of the attention has been 
focused on conflicts with current clients. This is probably because, unlike 
the FCA, Dodd-Frank permits whistleblowers to remain anonymous, even 
after the receipt of an award, thereby making it more likely that a lawyer 
will blow the whistle on a current client.289 
                                                                                                                           
 286 Id. § 205.2(a)(2)(i). 
 287 See, e.g., Pacella, supra note 7, at 1040–45; Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 8, at 23; 
Green & Thomas, supra note 144; LATHAM & WATKINS, supra note 90, at 6–15. 
 288 See generally N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8 (discussing whether a lawyer who 
is subject to the New York Rules of Professional Conduct may seek a Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
award). 
 289 Under Dodd-Frank, the SEC will ultimately need to learn the whistleblower’s identity for 
an award to be made, but the SEC has a statutory obligation to keep that information confidential. 
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Those who have addressed the issue agree, as do we, that just like an 
FCA lawyer-relator, a Dodd-Frank whistleblower-lawyer who is currently 
representing the company on the subject of the disclosure will likely violate 
Model Rule 1.7 with respect to “material limitation” conflicts.290 This is 
because there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation will be 
limited by the lawyer’s personal pecuniary interest in obtaining the whistle-
blower award, which is likely to compromise the lawyer’s ability to objec-
tively consider and advise the company concerning such questions as 
whether the company is violating the law, whether the legal violation poses 
a threat to the company, and whether suspected wrongdoing should be re-
ported to a higher level in the company.291 Moreover, such a conflict will be 
non-consentable if, given the amount of money at stake, the lawyer cannot 
reasonably believe that he or she can provide diligent and competent repre-
sentation.292 More important, as in FCA cases, it is unlikely that a client 
would consent to permitting its lawyer to be a Dodd-Frank whistleblower. 
Other aspects of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty under Dodd-Frank have 
not been as thoroughly discussed, including whether a lawyer may act ad-
versely to a current client by disclosing client information that is not the 
subject of the current representation. Some commentators have assumed 
that continued representation of the client on an unrelated matter would be 
ethically permissible,293 without addressing whether lawyers are permitted 
                                                                                                                           
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7(a). Under the FCA, the filing of the com-
plaint is done under seal, but the lawyer-relator’s name becomes public once the initial seal is 
lifted. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).  
 290 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7; Pacella, supra note 7, at 1048; Temkin & 
Moskovits, supra note 8, at 22–23; Green & Thomas, supra note 144. 
 291 Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 8, at 22–23; see also N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra 
note 8, at 11 (noting that “potential bounties range from $100,000 to literally millions of dollars in 
large cases”). According to the New York County Lawyers’ Association (“NYCLA”) opinion, an 
anticipated whistleblower bounty in excess of $100,000 “presumptively gives rise to a conflict of 
interest between the lawyer’s personal interest and that of the client.” N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 
supra note 8, at 11. The Committee believes that a conflict of interest arises in “the overwhelming 
majority of cases.” Id. The Committee does not address in what circumstances such a personal 
interest would not give rise to a conflict, other than to suggest that if the lawyer is required to 
make a disclosure to someone, then “financial incentive could be less of a factor in determining 
the existence of a conflict with the lawyer’s personal interest.” Id. New York Rule 3.3(b) provides 
one example of such a required disclosure: when the lawyer “knows that a person intends to en-
gage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to [a proceeding before 
a tribunal].” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(b) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 292 See N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 11. The NYCLA opinion cautions that 
“[i]n some circumstances the whistleblower-bounty conflict may be unwaiveable,” but we believe 
it is more accurate to say that this will typically be the case. See id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 293 See, e.g., Green & Thomas, supra note 144 (stating that a lawyer-whistleblower may con-
tinue representing a client after submitting information to the SEC unless the representation would 
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to act adversely to a current client, including whether fiduciary law requires 
them to avoid self-dealing even in unrelated information and to account for 
any profits received. Nor has there been any discussion of whether a lawyer 
must inform a client that the lawyer has disclosed information concerning 
the client’s wrongdoing to the SEC, or whether a lawyer may blow the 
whistle on a non-client third party without first seeking the client’s consent 
to take advantage of a financial opportunity that may belong to the client. 
As to all of these issues, we believe that the loyalty analysis under Dodd-
Frank is substantially similar to the analysis under the FCA,294 with the re-
sult that, although the disciplinary rules do not clearly prohibit lawyer con-
duct that is directly adverse to a current client on an unrelated matter, or 
seeking a financial reward for disclosing information adverse to a non-client 
third party, fiduciary law continues to broadly prevent the lawyer from re-
ceiving a significant financial reward at the client’s expense.295 
2. Former Clients 
There is little discussion of former-client conflicts under Dodd-Frank 
because, unlike the FCA, a lawyer-whistleblower does not act in any form 
of an arguably representative capacity. As a result, seeking a Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower award presumably would not violate Model Rule 1.9(a) or its 
state equivalents.296 
Nevertheless, a recent opinion of the New York County Lawyers’ As-
sociation’s Committee on Professional Ethics concluded that, even when a 
lawyer is permitted to disclose information under New York Rule 1.9(c),  
[U]ndertaking this otherwise permissible disclosure in a manner 
that results in a bounty for the lawyer raises a significant risk that 
the attorney’s judgment in determining whether the disclosure is 
‘reasonably necessary’ will be adversely affected and presents a 
conflict of interest that is beyond what Rule 1.9 was intended to 
allow.297 
                                                                                                                           
be affected by the attorney’s status as a whistleblower; for example, if the lawyer was requested to 
advise the client how to respond to an SEC inquiry prompted by the lawyer’s disclosure). 
 294 One difference is that, although Dodd-Frank whistleblowers are taking action directly 
adverse to their current clients, they are not publicly suing them, as are FCA relators. Whether this 
difference is a significant one is less clear. 
 295 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) (stating that a lawyer has a fiduciary duty to report profits made using client infor-
mation unless the client has given consent for such use); see also supra note 197 and accompany-
ing text. 
 296 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(a). 
 297 N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 14. 
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We disagree that New York Rule 1.9, which is based on Model Rule 
1.9, is properly interpreted to prohibit a lawyer from seeking a whistleblow-
er award. What little authority the Committee cited is clearly distinguisha-
ble,298 and courts should be reluctant to discipline a lawyer when there is no 
particular rule that can be plausibly interpreted to prohibit the conduct in 
question.299 Moreover, given that whistleblowing under Dodd-Frank does 
not involve litigation, there is no possibility of court disqualification based, 
not on the disciplinary rules themselves, but rather on the common law of 
lawyer disqualification. 
Even so, we believe that Dodd-Frank lawyer-whistleblowers do have a 
conflict of interest when they blow the whistle on a former client, even 
when they are ethically permitted to use or disclose that information under 
applicable rules of professional conduct. Our conclusion is based not on the 
disciplinary rules themselves, but rather on the existence of common-law 
fiduciary duties that are broader than the specific fiduciary duties codified 
in state disciplinary rules. An attorney’s fiduciary duty extends to former 
clients and includes the duty not to engage in self-dealing and to account for 
profits made with confidential information obtained during the lawyer-
client relationship.300 It may be that such breaches will be difficult to detect, 
given the anonymity permitted under the Dodd-Frank regulations, but it is 
at least possible that an actual or potential breach will be detected. Moreo-
                                                                                                                           
 298 The Committee cited Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, a 2011 California Supreme 
Court case, as “sustain[ing] a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a lawyer who was disloyal to 
a former client when he publicly protested a development permit that he himself had formerly 
obtained on behalf of the client, at considerable expense,” but the Goldman opinion focused on the 
lawyer’s adverse use of confidential client information rather than an impermissible disclosure. Id. 
at 13; see Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 250 P.3d 1115, 1122 (Cal. 2011). California had no 
confidentiality exception that would have permitted either the use or disclosure in that case. See 
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3-100(B) (STATE BAR OF CAL. 2015) (permitting the discre-
tionary disclosure of confidential information only when necessary to prevent a criminal act that is 
likely to result in substantial bodily injury or death). The Committee cited another case, Birnbaum 
v. Birnbaum, decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1989, for the broad proposition that a 
fiduciary’s “general duty of fidelity requires avoidance of situations in which personal interests 
conflict with the interests of those owed a fiduciary duty,” involved a nonlawyer fiduciary who 
engaged in self-dealing while he was a partner in a general partnership, and says nothing about the 
obligations of a former lawyer who is ethically permitted to use or disclose confidential infor-
mation under applicable disciplinary rules. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8, at 14 n.30; 
see Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574 (N.Y. 1989). 
 299 The NYCLA opinion appears to rely on New York Rule 1.9(c), which is based on Model 
Rule 1.9(c), but the Committee nowhere explains how the language of that provision should be 
interpreted to prohibit adverse action when the disclosure itself is permitted by a confidentiality 
exception. See generally N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, supra note 8. 
 300 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); see also Tri-
Growth Ctr. City, Ltd. v. Silldorf, Burdman, Duignan & Eisenberg, 265 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
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ver, although disciplinary action is both unlikely and probably unjustified, it 
may be possible for the company to seek to enjoin the lawyer from either 
disclosing information to the SEC pursuant to the whistleblower bounty 
program301 or collecting a whistleblower bounty. The company could also 
sue the lawyer to recover any profits received or for any damages attributa-
ble to the breach. Finally, if the SEC is convinced that lawyers violate their 
state law fiduciary duties when they seek a whistleblower bounty based on 
information obtained in the representation, the SEC may become reluctant 
to make such awards or to encourage such lawyers to report to them. The 
SEC might even consider amending its rules to clarify that lawyers who 
violate their common-law fiduciary duties to their clients are ineligible to 
participate in the whistleblower bounty programs. 
Of course, our conclusions with respect to the existence of an unethical 
conflict of interest for Dodd-Frank lawyer-whistleblowers, as well as for 
FCA lawyer-relators, assume that neither state rules of professional conduct 
nor state common-law fiduciary duties are preempted by federal law, which 
is the question to which we now briefly turn. 
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE ETHICS LAW 
A. The False Claims Act 
The three federal FCA cases that address lawyer-relators’ ethical du-
ties, United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. (“Doe”), United States ex rel. Fair 
Laboratory Practices Associates v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“FLPA II”), and 
United States ex rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman, assert that the FCA 
does not preempt state confidentiality rules.302 Certainly there is nothing in 
the text of the FCA statute that could be interpreted as express preemption 
                                                                                                                           
 301 A court would not prohibit disclosure of information to the SEC where applicable confi-
dentiality rules permit such disclosure, but could possibly prohibit disclosure in the manner re-
quired to trigger eligibility for a whistleblower bounty award. Such a prohibition would likely 
inhibit many lawyers from disclosing the information at all. 
 302 See United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA II), 
734 F.3d 154, 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Nothing in the False Claims Act evinces a clear legisla-
tive intent to preempt state statutes and rules that regulate an attorney’s disclosure of client confi-
dences. . . . The False Claims Act does not preempt state ethical rules governing the disclosure of 
client confidences . . . .”); United States ex rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman, No. 1:13cv85-
HSO-RHW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *11 (S.D. Miss. 2015) (the argument that “the FCA 
preempts the ethical rules . . . is not persuasive”); United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. (Doe), 862 
F. Supp. 1502, 1507 n.12 (E.D. Va. 1994) (“Congress expressed no intent in the Act to preempt 
state laws governing the attorney-client relationship. Nor is such an intent reasonably implied.”); 
see also United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA I), No. 
05-Civ.-5393 (RPP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24 2011), aff’d, 734 
F.3d 154 (“The FCA does not preempt state ethical rules . . . .”). 
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of state regulation of attorneys. 303  As for implied preemption, all three 
courts summarily dismissed this possibility, citing U.S. Supreme Court cas-
es declaring that in areas of traditional state regulation, the presumption 
against preemption cannot be overcome unless Congress has made such a 
purpose “clear and manifest.”304 
In Doe, the defendant urged the court to interpret the FCA to exclude 
lawyers from serving as qui tam relators against their own clients.305 The 
court found no basis in either the text or the legislative history of the statute 
to do so.306 As for the defendant’s argument that permitting lawyers to serve 
as plaintiffs against their own clients “would . . . encourage attorneys to 
flout their ethical obligations and use their clients’ confidential information 
to their own economic advantage,” the court responded that the FCA does 
not preempt state confidentiality rules, “does not authorize [a relator] to 
violate state law,” and does not “immunize a relator” who violates state 
law.307 The court further noted that permitting lawyers to “report their cli-
ents’ ongoing or planned fraudulent practices against the government” un-
deniably serves the “Congressional purpose underlying the qui tam provi-
sions [which] is ‘to enhance the Government’s ability to recover losses sus-
tained as a result of fraud against the Government.’”308 The Doe court con-
cluded: “[T]o the extent that state law permits a disclosure of client confi-
dences . . . then the attorney’s use of the qui tam mechanism to expose that 
fraud should be encouraged, not deterred.”309 
                                                                                                                           
 303 See, e.g., Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507 n.12 (“Congress expressed no intent in the Act to 
preempt state laws governing the attorney-client relationship.”). 
 304 See, e.g., id. (“[C]ourts must ‘start[] with the assumption that the historic police powers of 
the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.’” (latter alterations in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163 (“In areas of traditional state regula-
tion, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such 
an intention clear and manifest.” (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 
(2005))); Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507 (“Absent clear legislative intent to upset this settled practice, 
state law regarding the attorney-client relationship cannot be deemed preempted.”). 
 305 Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507 (“X Corp. protests that [allowing lawyers to serve as relators] 
severely impinges upon the common law relationship between attorney and client and could not 
have been intended by Congress.”). 
 306 Id. at 1506, 1508 (“Congress, in plain language, carefully fashioned specific exclusions to 
the class of eligible relators, and those exclusions did not include attorneys. . . . [T]he qui tam 
statute does not exclude lawyers or members of any particular profession from being relators 
. . . .”). 
 307 Id. at 1507 (“[W]here an attorney’s disclosure of client confidences is prohibited by state 
law in a given circumstance, that attorney risks subjecting himself to corresponding state discipli-
nary proceedings should he attempt to make the disclosure in a qui tam suit.”). 
 308 Id. at 1508 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5266). 
 309 Id. at 1507–08 (footnote omitted). 
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In FLPA II, the relator argued for a form of FCA preemption in order to 
avoid application of a state ethics code that prohibited disclosing confiden-
tial client information except when reasonably necessary to prevent future 
or ongoing crimes or frauds.310 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit quickly concluded that the FCA does not preempt state eth-
ics rules, the court then acknowledged “that the central purpose of the [New 
York] Rules—to protect client confidences—can be ‘inconsistent with or 
antithetical to federal interests’ . . . which under the FCA, are to ‘encourage 
private individuals who are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the 
[g]overnment to bring such information forward.’”311 Citing a prior disci-
plinary case, the court further explained that “[i]n such instances, courts 
must interpret and apply the [New York] Rules in a manner that ‘balances 
the varying federal interests at stake.’”312 
Looking at the specific facts of the case, the Second Circuit then found 
that applying New York’s confidentiality rule “could not have undermined 
the qui tam action” because the two other partners in FLPA, both nonlaw-
yers, had sufficient information to bring the lawsuit.313 As a result, applying 
the New York rule to Bibi, the lawyer who had previously represented the 
company, “would not affect, much less undermine, the federal interests em-
bodied in the FCA qui tam provision.” 314 As for the New York rule itself, 
the Second Circuit found that this particular rule “implicitly accounts for 
the federal interests at stake in the FCA by permitting disclosure of infor-
mation ‘necessary’ to prevent the ongoing commission of a crime.”315 
This “balancing of federal interests” aspect of the FLPA II opinion ap-
pears to contradict the court’s earlier finding that nothing in the FCA 
preempts state ethics rules. What would the Second Circuit have done if 
                                                                                                                           
 310 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163. Although the relator’s brief to the Second Circuit did not use the 
term “preemption,” it attempted to avoid application of the New York Rules by citing federal 
authority to the effect that “[w]hen state rules of professional conduct governing attorneys would 
frustrate the purposes of federal law, a federal court should apply the Model Rules.” Brief and 
Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 37. The Model Rules permit disclo-
sure of confidential client information not only to prevent future or ongoing crimes or frauds, but 
also to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the consequences of past crimes or frauds. See supra note 90 
and accompanying text. 
 311 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163 (quoting Grievance Comm. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640, 646 (2d Cir. 
1995); United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 312 Id. (quoting Grievance Comm., 48 F.3d at 646). 
 313 Id. at 164–65 (“By FLPA’s own admission, it was unnecessary for Bibi to participate in 
this qui tam action at all, much less to broadly disclose Unilab’s confidential information. . . . 
‘Baker and Michaelson each has ample relevant information to bring this case.’” (quoting Brief 
and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 43)). 
 314 Id. at 165 & n.16 (“FLPA could have brought the qui tam action based on the information 
that Baker and Michaelson possessed as former executives of Unilab.”). 
 315 Id. at 164; see N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.9(c) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2015). 
2015] Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers 1755 
Bibi’s conduct had been governed by a confidentiality rule prohibiting any 
disclosure to prevent future or ongoing client crimes or frauds? In that situa-
tion, if the Second Circuit found that the state confidentiality rule did not 
adequately account for the federal interests at stake in the FCA, then the 
opinion suggests that the court would not have used such a rule to disquali-
fy the relator, resulting in what looks very much like federal preemption of 
an otherwise applicable state rule. And with respect to the New York rules 
themselves, or similar rules, another court might find that a rule that permits 
disclosure only to prevent ongoing or future fraud unduly frustrates the pur-
pose of the FCA, which provides financial incentives for disclosure that can 
rectify past fraud. And what about a lawyer’s loyalty obligations under state 
law? In FLPA II, the government took the position that if the Second Circuit 
agreed with the district court that the former-client conflict rule prevented 
the relator from filing a qui tam lawsuit, this decision “would drastically 
and negatively affect the impact of the qui tam provisions of the [FCA].”316 
Aside from the former-client conflict rule, state fiduciary law broadly pro-
hibits both lawyers and nonlawyers from profiting from the disclosure of 
confidential client information, even when the disclosure itself is permit-
ted—law that, if applied, would clearly have a devastating impact on the 
ability of insiders to serve as qui tam relators. 
In Holmes, also an FCA lawsuit, the federal district court similarly re-
jected the relator’s argument that the FCA preempts state ethics stand-
ards.317 It quoted the Doe court’s observation that the FCA “does not author-
ize [a relator] to violate state laws,”318 and cited the FLPA II court’s rejec-
tion of federal preemption.319 
We believe that the possible preemption of at least some aspects of 
state ethics laws is a more complicated question than the Doe, FLPA II, or 
Holmes courts acknowledged. Although it is not our purpose to thoroughly 
explore this question, we must note some of the complicating factors, in-
cluding, but not limited to, the “balancing of federal interests” test that the 
Second Circuit invoked in FLPA II.320 Other complicating factors include a 
                                                                                                                           
 316 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 15. The brief quotes 
the government as further stating: “The faults that Quest finds with Bibi—his close relationship to 
the company that allegedly engaged in the fraud and his disclosure of his inside knowledge of the 
fraud—are precisely what makes relators valuable sources of information.” Id. 
 317 Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at *11. 
 318 Id. at *8 (quoting Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507). 
 319 Id. at *11 (citing FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163). The Holmes court also noted that applying 
ethics standards to a qui tam relator like Holmes was particularly appropriate because Holmes was 
acting pro se—an option available to him only because of his status as a lawyer and not available 
to nonlawyer-relators. 
 320 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163. 
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number of FCA counterclaim cases involving nonlawyers, in which courts 
have held that FCA defendants may not assert certain state law claims, and 
a more complicated picture of how obstacle or frustration preemption has 
fared in the Supreme Court. 
The FCA counterclaim cases involve attempts by company defendants 
to assert state law claims for indemnification and contribution as well as for 
enforcement of releases and nondisclosure agreements. For example, in 
1991, in Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court should have dismissed seven 
state law-based counterclaims seeking indemnification and contribution.321 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the “FCA is in no way intended to amelio-
rate the liability of wrongdoers by providing defendants with a remedy 
against a qui tam plaintiff with ‘unclean hands;’” that there is no federal 
basis for permitting FCA defendants to bring counterclaims for indemnifi-
cation or contribution; and that there is “no right to assert state law counter-
claims that, if prevailed on, would end in the same result.”322 Similarly, in 
2005, in United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Technologies, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a company could not 
seek to enforce release and indemnification clauses in a contract with the 
Department of Defense because enforcing such an agreement would “ignore 
the public policy objectives expressly spelled out by Congress in the FCA 
[and] provide disincentives to future relators.”323 Courts considering FCA 
cases have also limited state law counterclaims that are closely analogous to 
lawyers’ confidentiality and loyalty duties, refusing to enforce fiduciary or 
contractual duties to inform the defendant internally of the alleged violation 
and limiting the availability of counterclaims based on contractual nondis-
closure agreements.324 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Mortgages, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 322 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
 323 United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., 575 F.3d 458, 473–74 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
 324 See, e.g., Siebert v. Gene Sec. Network, No. 11-cv-01987-JST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
149145, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013) (dismissing the counterclaim that the relator breached a 
fiduciary duty by failing to report internally because “[g]enerally speaking, a breach of fiduciary 
duty claim arising out of a Plaintiff-relator’s failure to disclose a False Claims Act violation that 
subsequently becomes the basis of a qui tam claim is barred by the FCA”); United States ex rel. 
Vainer v. Davita, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-2509-CAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51359, at *15 (N.D. Ga. 
Feb. 13, 2013) (dismissing the FCA defendant’s counterclaim that the relator breached a contrac-
tual obligation to report FCA violations internally because such a counterclaim “amounts to a 
claim for indemnification or contribution”); United States ex rel. Head v. Kane Co., 668 
F. Supp. 2d 146, 151 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[A] private agreement may not be enforced when its terms 
. . . would have the effect of preventing individuals from furnishing evidence to the government or 
making allegations under the FCA, since this would unduly frustrate the Act’s purpose.”); United 
States ex rel. Grandeau v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 350 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775 (N.D. Ill. 
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These counterclaim cases do not expressly refer to federal preemption 
of state law, but rather speak in the language of public policy.325 Neverthe-
less, they give preemptive effect to the FCA over conflicting state law obli-
gations, using analysis that is analogous to obstacle or frustration preemp-
tion.326 And this form of implied preemption appears to be far more com-
plex and controversial than the cursory treatment in Doe and FLPA II sug-
gests. 
According to one recent commentary, the presumption against preemp-
tion in cases involving the historic police powers of the states is merely a 
presumption—not a “clear statement rule” requiring the identification of 
language in the statute declaring the purpose of Congress to preempt state 
law.327 Indeed, the same commentary observes that in obstacle preemption 
cases, “courts have no text dealing with preemption to construe.”328 As a 
result, courts must evaluate “the degree of tension between state law and 
                                                                                                                           
2004) (“[P]ublic interest in the production of [defendant’s] records trumps any fiduciary obliga-
tion or any confidentiality agreement.”). 
 325 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (denying defendant’s motion to strike the relators’ exhibits that were allegedly taken in 
violation of a non-disclosure agreement, and noting that “the strong public policy [of the FCA] 
would be thwarted if [a defendant] could silence whistleblowers”). 
 326 At least two court decisions and one article have acknowledged the federal preemption 
frame for analyzing these counterclaim issues. Siebert, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149145, at *13 
(noting that “[i]t is possible . . . that the holding in Mortgages is based on conflict preemption 
principles”); United States v. Dynamics Research Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (D. Mass. 
2006) (examining whether counterclaims are preempted by the FCA); Thomas F. O’Neil III et al., 
The Buck Stops Here: Preemption of Third-Party Claims by the False Claims Act, 12 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 41, 51 n.53 (1995) (“Many of the cases [addressing contribution and indem-
nification] do not specifically discuss the preemption doctrine or explain their holdings in these 
terms. However, the courts’ rationale that state law claims would undermine the FCA amounts to 
the application of the doctrine sub silentio.”). The counterclaim cases could also be characterized 
as demonstrating preemptive effect of the federal common law. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption 
and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1640 (2008) (describing the develop-
ment of “federal common law rules in cases concerning the rights and obligations of the United 
States”). 
 327 Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption 
in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 271. Professor Young cites and quotes from Justice 
Scalia’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., a 1992 Supreme 
Court case also cited by the Doe court: 
See, for example, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J, 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“Though we generally ‘as-
sume that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . 
Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress,’ we have tradi-
tionally not thought that to require express statutory text.”) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 
230). 
Id. at 271 n.85 (alterations in original); see also Doe, 862 F. Supp. at 1507 n.12 (citing Cipollone, 
505 U.S. at 545, as authority for federal preemption inquiries). 
 328 See Young, supra note 327, at 274. 
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congressional purpose,” and the critical question will be “just how much 
conflict is tolerable.”329 According to another commentary, “so-called ‘ob-
stacle preemption’ potentially covers not only cases in which state and fed-
eral law contradict each other, but also all other cases in which courts think 
that the effects of state law will hinder accomplishment of the purposes be-
hind federal law.”330 Finally, scholars have noted the Supreme Court’s fail-
ure to use the presumption in a consistent manner, prompting calls for its 
explicit abandonment and causing at least one commentator to declare that 
the Court has “created a presumption in favor of preemption.”331 Given the 
apparent weakening of the presumption against preemption, it is hardly sur-
prising to find that FCA courts in nonlawyer cases have not hesitated to ef-
fectively preempt counterclaims based on state law in light of the obstacle 
such claims present to furthering the purposes of the FCA. 
If the FCA counterclaim cases are correct that the FCA preempts some 
state law obligations based on contract or agency law, then does it also 
preempt a lawyer’s similar obligations, including those based on state attor-
ney conduct rules? Not necessarily. Some commentators have argued that 
lawyers, together with other independent third parties, play a unique role as 
“gatekeepers,” whose “consent is necessary to allow issuers or investors to 
proceed with transactions,” or as “corporate monitors,” who monitor a 
company’s compliance with its legal obligations.332 Gatekeepers arguably 
do not need financial incentives because they already have strong “reputa-
tional concerns that stem beyond their relationship with the corporation.”333 
                                                                                                                           
 329 Id. at 274–75; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 727, 729 (2008) (“[T]he key question in most preemption cases entails a discretionary 
judgment about the permissible degree of tension between federal and state law, a question that 
typically cannot be answered using the tools of statutory interpretation.”). 
 330 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 228–29 (2000). Professor Nelson is criti-
cal of such a broad use of obstacle preemption, concluding that “the mere fact that federal law 
serves certain purposes does not automatically mean that it contradicts everything that might get in 
the way of those purposes.” Id. at 231–32. 
 331 Young, supra note 327, at 307 & n.290 (quoting Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presump-
tion in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 971 (2002)). 
 332 See, e.g., Pacella, supra note 7, at 1057–58. 
 333 Id. at 1058. This part of Pacella’s argument is more persuasive than her further argument that 
lawyers in general are “commonly described as ‘gatekeepers’” and therefore should also be prohibit-
ed from receiving financial incentives. Id. While some lawyers serve as gatekeepers, many do not. 
Pacella also describes lawyers as “corporate monitors,” with preexisting duties to the company to 
intervene to avoid corporate wrongdoing that could harm the company. Id. at 1057. As such, she 
argues that they “should not be incentivized in the same manner to disclose information as the rank-
and-file employee,” presumably because financial incentives may cost them “their intimate relation-
ship with the corporation.” Id. at 1058. Given that we do not believe that all corporate lawyers per-
form the narrow “gatekeeping” role, we suggest that the more general description of lawyers as “cor-
porate monitors” could be used to buttress normative arguments that financial incentives to blow the 
whistle are incompatible with unique lawyer functions. See id. at 1057–58. 
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As for corporate monitors, their effectiveness depends on a company’s will-
ingness to treat them as trustworthy insiders, which may be difficult once 
the company understands the lawyer’s eligibility to receive a whistleblower 
bounty.334 
It may also be appropriate to treat lawyers’ obligations stemming from 
a state ethics code differently than obligations arising under general com-
mon law, including the law regulating private agreements. For example, as a 
matter of public policy, there is no reason to think that contractual confiden-
tiality arrangements between two private parties serve the public interest, 
but a state supreme court’s adoption of a professional rule for lawyers does 
reflect that court’s assessment of the competing public interests at stake in a 
lawyer-client relationship.335 These include both the interest in protecting 
the confidentiality expectations of clients and the interest in preventing, 
mitigating, or rectifying client crimes or frauds.336 So there may be more 
reason to defer to a state professional rule than a contractual arrangement 
between private parties or even a fiduciary’s common-law obligation not to 
profit from a client’s confidential information. 
In addition, if FCA courts were to routinely enforce nondisclosure 
agreements against relators who disclose fraud, that could spell the end of 
qui tam cases because companies can impose such agreements on all of 
their employees. Similarly, if FCA courts were to routinely enforce an em-
ployee-agent’s common-law duty not to profit from the employer’s confi-
dential information, there would be few insiders in a position to serve as qui 
tam relators. Court enforcement of lawyer ethics rules, on the other hand, 
will affect only a narrow slice of possible relators. This excluded group 
would include lawyers currently representing clients in the same or a sub-
stantially related matter and former lawyers for a client where applicable 
state ethics codes prohibit disclosure under the particular circumstances. 
Depending on a court’s interpretation of the former-client conflict rule, this 
group could also include former lawyers bringing a qui tam suit against a 
former client in the same or a substantially related matter; however, under 
the Second Circuit’s “balancing of federal interests” approach in FLPA II, 
such a broad interpretation of an ambiguous ethics rule could fail on the 
                                                                                                                           
 334 This normative argument against lawyer eligibility for whistleblower awards would also 
seem to apply to nonlawyer compliance professionals. In drafting its Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
regulations, the SEC specifically allows compliance professionals to be eligible for its whistle-
blower awards, but on terms different from other employees. They must first engage in internal 
whistleblowing and then wait 120 days before submitting information about violations to the SEC. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B), (iv)(C) (2012). 
 335 See FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 154. 
 336 See id. 
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ground that it does not sufficiently take account of the federal interests un-
der the FCA.337 
B. Dodd-Frank 
Like the FCA, the Dodd-Frank whistleblowing provision is silent on 
the question of federal preemption of state law, including state laws govern-
ing lawyers. Similarly, the SEC’s implementing regulations do not use the 
term “preemption.” 338 But those regulations build on the agency’s earlier 
regulation of lawyers under SOX, which created new confidentiality excep-
tions for lawyers practicing before the SEC,339 and asserted that it preempts 
state ethics rules that are “in conflict” with the SOX regulation.340 When the 
SEC promulgated the SOX regulation, it argued that contrary state ethics 
rules would frustrate the purposes of SOX, whereas some elements of the 
organized bar argued that the SEC lacked the authority to preempt state con-
fidentiality rules.341 Given that the SOX legislation expressly delegated to 
the SEC a mandate to set “minimum standards of conduct” for lawyers 
practicing before the SEC, we find the SEC’s arguments largely persua-
sive.342 Nevertheless, because the SOX legislation focused on up-the-ladder 
                                                                                                                           
 337 See id. In refusing to give an ambiguous state court rule its broadest possible meaning, out 
of deference to important federal interests, it is unclear whether the district court in FLPA I was 
engaging in the functional equivalent of federal preemption. See FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
37014, at *22–32. 
 338 On the other hand, the SEC’s intention to preempt conflicting state ethics rules in its whis-
tleblower program is clear from the way it defines the “original information” that is eligible for a 
whistleblower award. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b). Ordinarily, information obtained “in connection 
with the legal representation of a client” cannot form the basis for an award. Id. § 240.21F-
4(b)(4)(ii). But the SEC permits such information to be the basis for an award if a lawyer may 
disclose such information pursuant to either the SOX regulation or “the applicable state attorney 
conduct rules,” id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii), and the SOX regulation itself asserts that it preempts 
conflicting state confidentiality rules, 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2003). 
 339 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2). 
 340 Id. § 205.1 (“Where the standards of a state or other United States jurisdiction where an 
attorney is admitted or practices conflict with this part, this part shall govern.”). The regulation 
also provides a safe harbor for lawyers facing state bar discipline for making disclosures con-
sistent with the regulation. Id. § 205.6 (“An attorney who complies in good faith with the provi-
sions of this part shall not be subject to discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent standards 
imposed by any state or other United States jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or practic-
es.”). 
 341 See Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 
49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004), for an insightful summary of the debate between the SEC, the ABA, 
and the Washington and California state bars. 
 342 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2012). The statute directs the SEC to issue “minimum professional 
standards, including” the specific standards on reporting up within organizations. Id. The use of 
the word “including” indicates that Congress’s grant of authority to the SEC is broader than simp-
ly the reporting up rules, and the use of the word “minimum” indicates that the SEC regulations 
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reporting, and did not expressly contemplate lawyers reporting violations 
outside of the company to the SEC, we acknowledge that the preemptive 
status of the SEC’s SOX regulation is at least questionable.343 
The issue of SOX preemption was never judicially resolved, perhaps be-
cause no lawyers made disclosures that were permitted by that regulation but 
prohibited under applicable state rules.344 But now that the SEC has promised 
financial incentives for individuals—including lawyers—who make whistle-
blower disclosures under Dodd-Frank, lawyers may (finally) be disclosing 
information that they have been permitted to disclose since 2003. Even so, it 
is not clear how a lawyer’s disclosure under the Dodd-Frank program will 
result in a judicial determination of whether SOX preempts more restrictive 
state confidentiality rules, given that the statute requires the SEC to keep 
whistleblowers’ identities confidential.345 
The SEC’s Dodd-Frank regulations clearly state that lawyers are not 
precluded from receiving an award if their disclosure was permissible either 
under state attorney ethics codes or under the SOX regulation.346 But even if 
lawyers are ethically permitted to disclose client wrongdoing to the SEC, 
what about their loyalty obligations under state law? What is the signifi-
cance of the SEC’s failure to even mention lawyers’ loyalty obligations un-
der state law?347 A lawyer-whistleblower might argue that the SEC regula-
tion, read literally, permits a lawyer to receive an award, so long as the dis-
closure itself is permitted.348 But it is unclear whether, in drafting the regu-
                                                                                                                           
would displace state rules that fall beneath that minimum standard. Cramton et al., supra note 341, 
at 791–92. 
 343 See, e.g., Temkin & Moskovits, supra note 8, at 18–22 (arguing that the SOX regulation 
does not preempt less permissive state confidentiality rules). 
 344 See Cramton et al., supra note 341, at 808 (predicting that “few if any lawyers will exer-
cise discretion to disclose material violations outside the corporation”). 
 345 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (2012). When the SEC announces whistleblower awards, it 
reveals neither the identity of the whistleblower nor the identity of the company that was sanc-
tioned. Id.; see, e.g., In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with [Undisclosed Par-
ty], supra note 260. 
 346 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)–(ii). 
 347 These loyalty obligations include the requirement to avoid conflicts of interest and to keep 
the client informed. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015) (requir-
ing a lawyer to keep a client “reasonably informed about the status” of a matter); id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (re-
stricting a lawyer’s ability to represent a client where there is a significant risk that the representation 
will be materially limited by the lawyer’s personal interest); id. r. 1.8(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
acquiring a pecuniary interest adverse to a client without the client’s informed consent); id. r. 1.13(b) 
(requiring a lawyer for an organization who knows of a “violation of law that reasonably might be 
imputed to the organization” to “refer the matter to higher authority in the organization”); see also 17 
C.F.R. § 205.3(b) (requiring an attorney who “becomes aware of evidence of a material violation” to 
“report such evidence to the issuer’s chief legal officer”). 
 348 Nothing in the eligibility provision of the Dodd-Frank regulation prohibits lawyers from 
receiving a bounty award. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d). Indeed, lawyers are not mentioned at all in 
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lation, the SEC ever considered conflicting ethical obligations other than 
those found in confidentiality rules,349 and it is similarly unclear whether it 
intends to grant an award if it is convinced that the lawyer is violating a 
state law that is not preempted by the prior SOX regulation. 
Here, as with the FCA, if courts clearly confront the preemption ques-
tion, they will need to seriously consider the possibility that some aspects of 
the state regulation of lawyers unduly frustrate the objectives of the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower program. Once again, some commentators believe that 
some lawyers might be distinguished from nonlawyers on the basis of their 
role as “gatekeepers” or “corporate monitors.”350 We believe that lawyer 
conduct rules can be distinguished from contract and general fiduciary law 
that applies to lawyers and nonlawyers alike. If so, then the SEC should 
refuse to reward a lawyer who clandestinely discloses client information in 
an ongoing representation, given that the lawyer would be violating code 
provisions prohibiting current client conflicts and requiring keeping the cli-
ent informed of significant developments.351 On the other hand, the SEC 
might conclude that broader state fiduciary law is preempted, because pre-
venting lawyers and other fiduciaries from profiting as a result of their dis-
closure of client information could eviscerate the whistleblower reward 
program that Congress has authorized. 
IV. CHOICE OF LAW 
As we have seen, state ethics rules frequently differ, particularly rules 
governing the disclosure exceptions to the duty of confidentiality.352 If nei-
                                                                                                                           
that provision. See id. Lawyers who acquire information as a result of a client representation are 
mentioned only in the provision defining “[o]riginal information,” and, as previously described, 
that section clearly treats as “original” any information that a lawyer is ethically permitted to dis-
close under either state attorney conduct rules or the SOX regulation. Id. § 240.21F-4(b); see su-
pra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 349 The ABA submitted a letter to the SEC arguing that financial incentives for whistleblow-
ing lawyers “create[] an objectionable conflict of interest.” Pacella, supra note 7, at 1049 n.135 
(quoting Letter from Stephen N. Zack, President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 
20, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/governmental_affairs_periodicals/washington
letter/2011/june/attorneyclientprivilege.html [http://perma.cc/Q65C-29N7]). However, the SEC 
commentary accompanying both the preliminary and final Dodd-Frank regulation does not men-
tion lawyers’ loyalty obligations, including conflicts of interest and keeping the client informed of 
important developments. 
 350 See id. at 1057–58. 
 351 We refer to current and not former lawyers because unlike the FCA, a Dodd-Frank lawyer-
whistleblower is not acting on behalf of another; therefore, a former lawyer is not even arguably 
violating the former-client conflict rule. Similarly, unlike current lawyers, a former lawyer gener-
ally has no obligation to keep the client informed of developments in the subject of the representa-
tion. 
 352 See supra notes 26–123 and accompanying text. 
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ther the FCA nor Dodd-Frank preempts state ethics rules, then lawyers con-
templating blowing the whistle need to know which state’s rules apply. Un-
fortunately, given that these whistleblower programs often involve national 
companies with multiple offices,353 as well as in-house lawyers who are not 
necessarily licensed in either the state where they advise the company or the 
state where a disclosure may occur,354 many lawyers will have difficulty 
predicting which state’s ethics rules govern. As with preemption, we do not 
intend to thoroughly explore the choice of law issues raised in these federal 
programs. Rather, our more limited purpose is to note the complexity of the 
problem and the failure of the existing case law to grapple with this com-
plexity. In addition, because the SEC’s Dodd-Frank regulation apparently 
preempts state confidentiality rules that are more strict than the SEC’s own 
SOX regulation, and because loyalty provisions do not differ significantly 
from state to state, we will focus our discussion on the very difficult choice 
of law issues that arise when a federal court attempts to determine the ethi-
cal propriety of a lawyer-relator’s disclosure of confidential client infor-
mation in bringing a qui tam lawsuit under the FCA. 
In the United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp. series of cases, the in-house 
lawyer who sought to serve as a qui tam relator was licensed in Pennsylva-
nia, but worked for the defendant company in California and in Virginia, 
where he was terminated.355 When he informed the company that he was 
going to file a retaliatory discharge lawsuit, the company filed an action in 
federal district court in Virginia, seeking the return of documents and a pre-
liminary injunction preventing him from disclosing the company’s confi-
dential information.356 
Doe argued that because he was a member of the Pennsylvania Bar, 
Pennsylvania ethics code provisions should apply.357 The court, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 353 See, e.g., Boozang, supra note 21, at 15. 
 354 See, e.g., X Corp. v. Doe (X Corp. I), 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1300, 1304 n.11 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
(in-house lawyer licensed in Pennsylvania worked for corporation first in California and then in 
Virginia, where he was residing when he disclosed confidential client information in a qui tam 
lawsuit filed in a Virginia federal district court); cf. Schaefer v. Gen. Elec., No. 307CV00858, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2008) (former in-house lawyer filed Title VII 
class action in Connecticut, where defendant company was headquartered). Schaefer initially 
worked for the defendant in Ohio, then worked in Wisconsin and Georgia before accepting a posi-
tion in Pennsylvania, where she appears to have been residing when she last worked for defendant. 
First Amended Class Action Complaint at 23–25, Schaefer, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5552 (No. 
307CV00858). 
 355 X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1298–301. 
 356 Id. at 1301. 
 357 Id. at 1304 n.11. Although the court did not state how the Pennsylvania rule differed from 
the Virginia rule, the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility in effect at that time was unu-
sual in permitting disclosure only of “[i]nformation which clearly establishes that his client has, in 
the course of the representation, perpetuated [sic] upon a third party a fraud related to the subject 
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found that “a [federal] court sitting in a diversity case applies the conflicts 
[of law] rules of the forum state” and that “Virginia applies the substantive 
law of the place of the wrong,” citing a Virginia torts case.358 Because Doe 
lived in Virginia at the time of the lawsuit, had taken copies of documents 
and maintained them there, and because “the confidential disclosures sought 
to be restrained would presumably be made in or from Virginia,” the court 
applied the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility359 and issued the 
injunction that subsequently prevented Doe from receiving an award from 
the settlement of the FCA lawsuit he had filed.360 The district court’s find-
ings as to choice of law were upheld without discussion in Doe’s appeal to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.361 
Given that Doe was a diversity action and not an FCA lawsuit, the dis-
trict court understandably relied on conflict of laws rules applied in diversi-
ty actions, thereby looking to the forum state’s conflict of laws rules.362 The 
court did not explain, however, why it chose to look at the conflict of laws 
rules applied in torts cases, as opposed to disciplinary cases, or the conflict 
of laws rules applied in contracts, agency, or other lawsuits involving the 
provision of services.363 If the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility 
had contained a choice of law provision, then perhaps the court would have 
looked to that provision instead.364 At that time, however, neither the Vir-
ginia Code nor other state attorney codes had a special choice of law provi-
                                                                                                                           
matter of the representation.” Id. at 1308–09 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 
VA. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (VA. STATE BAR ASS’N 1983)). Neither 
the Model Code nor the Model Rules requires that a client crime or fraud be “clearly” established 
before the lawyer has permission to disclose the information. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT r. 1.6(b)(2)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101(C)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 358 X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1304 n.11 (citing McMillan v. McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662 (Va. 
1979)). 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. at 1312; see Under Seal v. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435, 1435 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) 
(affirming the district court’s grant of injunctive relief). 
 361 Under Seal, 17 F.3d at 1435 (“[W]hile John Doe was qualified as a lawyer in Pennsylva-
nia, at the time he was terminated by X Corp. and for some time previously, he was an X Corp. 
employee in Virginia.”). In a subsequent opinion granting summary judgment for X Corp. on its 
various claims and on Doe’s claim for retaliatory discharge, the district court cited its earlier opin-
ion for the proposition that “Virginia law governs here” and that “Doe advances no new or suffi-
cient reason to reconsider this conclusion.” X Corp. v. Doe (X Corp. II), 816 F. Supp. 1086, 1091 
n.8 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff’d sub nom. Under Seal, 17 F.3d 1435. 
 362 See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 363 X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1304 n.11. In stating that “Virginia applies the substantive law 
of the place of the wrong,” the court cited—without explanation—a case that involved a torts 
claim. See id. (citing McMillan, 253 S.E.2d 662). 
 364 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. 
(FLPA II), 734 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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sion.365 It was only in 1993 that the ABA Model Rules were amended to 
provide such a provision, 366  and that provision was amended again in 
2002.367 As a result, different state ethics rules now have not only different 
confidentiality and other substantive provisions, but also different ap-
proaches to choice of law for purposes of attorney discipline.368 
In United States ex rel. Fair Laboratory Practices Associates v. Quest 
Diagnostics, Inc. (“FLPA I”), the relator filed a qui tam action under the 
FCA.369 The company filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit and to disqualify 
the partnership-relator—Fair Laboratory Practices Associates (“FLPA”)—as 
well as its general partners and its counsel on the ground that Bibi, one of the 
general partners, had violated his ethical obligations as a former in-house 
lawyer for the company by disclosing confidential information in connection 
with the lawsuit.370 Defendant Quest was a publicly traded Delaware corpora-
tion headquartered in New Jersey.371 Bibi was licensed only in New York,372 
but had been employed in New Jersey by defendant Unilab, before Unilab 
was acquired by Quest, 373 and was still working in New Jersey at the time of 
the lawsuit.374 The two other former Unilab executives who joined Bibi to 
form FLPA were also employed at that time in New Jersey.375 Shortly after 
                                                                                                                           
 365 See Geoffrey J. Ritts, Professional Responsibility and the Conflict of Laws, 18 J. LEGAL 
PROF. 17, 20 (1993) (noting that the 1993 amended version of Model Rule 8.5 was the first codi-
fied choice of law rule for lawyer conduct). 
 366 Id. 
 367 See, e.g., 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 152, § 70.05 (discussing the revision of Rule 
8.5(b) as part of the ABA’s Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice project). 
 368 AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE IMPLEMENTATION OF ABA MJP POLICIES (Aug. 24, 2014), http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/recommendatio
ns.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/6P3C-PJ6A] (demonstrating that thirty-five states have 
adopted the current version of Model Rule 8.5(b) or substantially similar provisions, two states 
and the District of Columbia have rules based on the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b), and thir-
teen states have a different rule or no rule at all); CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., AM. 
BAR ASS’N, VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 8.5: 
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY; CHOICE OF LAW (May 4, 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_8_5.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/
LJG7-2BUG]. 
 369 United States ex rel. Fair Lab. Practices Assocs. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (FLPA I), No. 
05-Civ.-5393 (RPP), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011), aff’d, 734 
F.3d 154. 
 370 Id. at *17–19. 
 371 Id. at *2–4. 
 372 Id. at *7. 
 373 See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 8, 38 n.30. 
 374 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *42. At the time they formed FLPA, Bibi and 
the other former executives were employed by yet another company, Life Sciences Research, Inc., 
located in Hackensack, New Jersey. Id. at *5. 
 375 Id. 
1766 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1697 
the partnership was formed, FLPA filed the original qui tam lawsuit in a fed-
eral district court in New York.376 
The federal district court in FLPA I took a different approach than the 
Doe court to the choice of law issue, although it ultimately reached the 
same result of applying the ethics rules of the forum state. It began by not-
ing that “[w]hile federal courts may look to the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and state disciplinary rules for guidance, such rules are not binding 
on this court.”377 It went on, however, to note that “[t]he ‘salutary provi-
sions [of the New York rules] . . . have consistently been relied upon by 
courts of this district and circuit in evaluating the ethical conduct of attor-
neys.’”378 The court then looked to the choice of law provision in the New 
York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which stated:  
For conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before 
which a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or 
for purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be 
the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the 
rules of the court provide otherwise.379  
Because Bibi was a member of the New York Bar and the FCA lawsuit had 
been filed in the Southern District of New York, the court concluded that 
the choice of law provision in the New York Code dictated that Bibi’s con-
duct be evaluated under the relevant provisions of the New York Code.380 
As in Doe, the circuit court of appeals upheld the district court’s choice of 
law determination without significant discussion.381 
FLPA I is arguably more instructive than Doe because it involved a 
lawsuit brought under the FCA. As a result, the court was not bound to ap-
                                                                                                                           
 376 Id. at *17. 
 377 Id. at *19 (quoting Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
 378 Id. 
 379 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–20 (quoting N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105(B)(1) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2007)). 
 380 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–20. 
 381 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hull, 513 F.2d at 571 n.12) (noting merely, without 
acknowledging any dispute over choice of which state’s laws to apply, that “[a]s a general matter, 
the ‘salutory provisions [of New York’s ethical rules] have consistently been relied upon by the 
courts of this district and circuit in evaluating the ethical conduct of attorneys’”); see also X Corp. 
I, 805 F. Supp. at 1304 n.11. The Second Circuit FLPA II opinion noted that the district court had 
applied the New York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility, which had been replaced by 
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct after the filing of the lawsuit. FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 
157 n.1. Because the parties relied on the New York Rules in their briefs, and because the parties 
agreed that the substantive standards were the same, the Second Circuit’s opinion cites the New 
York Rules throughout its opinion. Id. The court did not reference the fact that FLPA had argued 
in its brief that the New Jersey Rules, not the New York Rules, should apply to Bibi’s conduct. 
See Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 207, at 38 n.30. 
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ply the forum state’s choice of law rules, as it would be in a diversity action, 
because state law did not directly apply to the federal question of FLPA’s 
eligibility to serve as a qui tam relator.382 Although it was not bound to do 
so, the court looked to the law of the forum state, in this case New York, 
because New York’s professional conduct rules “have been consistently re-
lied upon by courts of this district and circuit in evaluating the ethical con-
duct of attorneys.”383 Here the court cited both Second Circuit precedent 
involving disqualification of a lawyer representing one of the parties, and 
the federal district court’s own local rule, which was adopted from the New 
York Lawyer’s Code of Professional Responsibility.384 
It is true that in ruling on a motion to disqualify a lawyer, many courts 
more or less automatically choose to apply the rules of the forum or, in the 
case of federal district courts, the rules of the forum state.385 But this ap-
proach is problematic. The application of the forum’s own rules to attorneys 
representing the parties in a lawsuit is probably justified by courts’ inherent 
authority to regulate the conduct of the lawyers who appear before them, as 
well as the distinction between procedure and substance, under which “the 
                                                                                                                           
 382 Neither the Doe nor the FLPA I court was bound to apply the rules of professional conduct 
of any jurisdiction. These rules are adopted for the purpose of providing a basis for lawyer disci-
pline and are not binding on courts in other proceedings, including claims involving malpractice, 
breach of fiduciary duty, disqualification, and fee forfeiture. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT scope 20. In other types of proceedings addressing a lawyer’s conduct, courts frequent-
ly look to rules of professional conduct, but violation of an attorney conduct rule is not necessarily 
determinative outside the context of a disciplinary proceeding. See id. Of course, in Doe, a diversi-
ty action, the court was bound to apply state law, including state precedent as to the role of disci-
plinary rules in breach of fiduciary duty actions. See supra note 304 and accompanying text. In 
FLPA I and II, however, we argue that the courts were not bound to look to state law at all, but 
rather could rely solely on federal law to determine the eligibility of relators for a financial award 
under the FCA. See infra note 401 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, having chosen to rely on 
state law, which the courts were free to do, the FLPA courts needed to determine which state’s 
rules to apply. Cf. X Corp. I, 805 F. Supp. at 1304 n.11 (applying choice of law principles in de-
termining which state’s law applied to the company’s former lawyer in diversity case). 
 383 FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 154. 
 384 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–20 (citing Southern District of New York 
Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(5)). The Second Circuit appellate opinion similarly applied the New York 
ethics rules, but without any discussion of the choice of law issue. See FLPA II, 734 F.3d at 163. 
The district court’s local rule governed the discipline of attorneys for conduct “[i]n connection 
with activities in this Court,” Southern District of New York Local Civil Rule 1.5(b)(5), but Bibi 
was not appearing before the district court as an attorney representing a client; therefore the ap-
plicability of the local rule was questionable. See FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–
20. Similarly, we argue that the district court’s reliance on Second Circuit precedents in attorney 
disqualification cases was also questionable. See id. 
 385 Like the Southern District of New York, most federal district courts have adopted local 
rules for lawyer conduct, and like the Southern District, most local rules adopt the lawyer conduct 
code of the forum state. See Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney 
Conduct in Federal Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 10–12 (2005). 
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forum will apply its own local law to matters of procedure and the other-
wise applicable law to matters of substance.”386 But in FCA lawsuits, a law-
yer-relator is not appearing before the court as an attorney representing a 
party,387 and the ethical propriety of the relator’s conduct does not involve 
matters of judicial administration or related procedural questions for which 
the “forum has compelling reasons for applying its own rules.”388 Rather, 
we believe that the ethical conduct of a lawyer-whistleblower under the 
FCA is best characterized as substantive because it affects the lawyer’s eli-
gibility to receive a whistleblower award.389 
                                                                                                                           
 386 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 6, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 
1971); cf. Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Uniform Ethics 
Rules in Federal Court: Jurisdictional Issues in Professional Regulation, 50 REC. ASS’N B. CITY 
N.Y. 842, 870 (1995) (stating that rules for “[l]awyers litigating in federal court should . . . be . . . 
in harmony with important objectives of the judicial system”). According to the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws, the distinction is between issues involving “judicial administration,” in 
which “[t]he forum has compelling reasons for applying its own rules to decide such issues even if 
the case has foreign contacts and even if many issues in the case will be decided by reference to 
the local law of another state.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a. 
 387 In 2015 in United States ex rel. Holmes v. Northrop Grumman, the federal district court 
similarly relied on federal precedent in addressing motions to disqualify a lawyer from represent-
ing a client in federal litigation. See No. 1:13cv85-HSO-RHW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71804, at 
*9 (S.D. Miss. June 3, 2015) (citing Fifth Circuit choice of law precedent in disqualification cas-
es). In that case, however, Holmes was appearing pro se, and the court gave as its reason for rely-
ing on such precedent that lawyer-relators (and not nonlawyer-relators) are entitled to appear pro 
se because they have ethical obligations, including obligations of candor to the court, and viola-
tions of these obligations “may result in serious consequences to the errant attorney.” Id. at *5 
(quoting United States ex rel. Schwartz v. TRW, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (C.D. Cal. 2000)). 
We believe that most lawyer-relators will choose to be represented by counsel; therefore, federal 
district courts are likely to rely primarily on FLPA I and II in addressing choice of law issues. 
Unlike the Second Circuit and most other circuit courts of appeal, the Fifth Circuit looks not to the 
ethics rules of either the district court or the forum state, but rather to both “applicable ‘local and 
national ethical’ standards.” Id. at *9 (quoting FDIC v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1314 (5th 
Cir. 1995)). In identifying applicable “local” standards, the Mississippi federal district court 
looked not only to the Mississippi rules, but also to the D.C. Rules because much of Holmes’s 
conduct occurred while the case was pending in D.C. federal district court. Id. 
 388 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 cmt. a. 
 389 There are also some other settings in which a court could properly apply its local rules to a 
lawyer-party who seeks to represent others, but not in a lawyer-client relationship, such as when a 
lawyer-plaintiff seeks to serve as a class representative or to pursue a shareholder derivative ac-
tion. In those cases, the court must determine whether the lawyer-plaintiff will serve as an ade-
quate representative, therefore, the issue is properly characterized as procedural. See, e.g., FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (class action); id. r. 23.1(a) (shareholder derivative action). Certainly in federal 
courts, it is well-settled that ethical issues that arise in the context of applying the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure are best settled under federal procedural law because of the significance of up-
holding federal law and policy. See, e.g., Boccardo v. Comm’r, 56 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the state ethical rule forbidding lawyers from assuming litigation costs conflicted 
with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and was therefore invalid); Rand v. Monsan-
to Co., 926 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that the local rule limiting advancing of legal 
costs is trumped by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because local rules adopting state ethical 
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Of course, the FLPA I court looked initially to the New York Code not 
for its substantive provisions, but rather for its choice of law rule.390 But this 
too was problematic. As with most disciplinary choice of law rules, the New 
York Code had two provisions: one for litigation and one for non-
litigation.391 The New York litigation choice of law provision looks to the 
rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits for lawyer conduct “in con-
nection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been admit-
ted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding) . . . un-
less the rules of the court provide otherwise.”392 But there was no indication 
that Bibi had been admitted to practice before the federal district court 
where the lawsuit was pending. 
Unlike the New York rule cited in FLPA I, the Model Rules’ litigation 
choice of law provision applies the rules of the jurisdiction in which a tri-
bunal sits “for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribu-
nal,” without regard to whether the lawyer has been admitted to practice 
before that tribunal.393 Nevertheless, we believe that “conduct in connection 
with a matter pending before a tribunal” should generally be confined to the 
conduct of a lawyer representing a party, and not to the conduct of a lawyer-
relator.394 This is because when lawyers are appearing before the tribunal as 
party-representatives and “officers of the court”395 the forum has the great-
est interest in applying its own rules.396 
                                                                                                                           
rules “are valid only to the extent they are consistent with national rules”); In re WorldCom, Inc. 
Secs. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 284–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that a state ethics rule that con-
flicts with class action provisions in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is invalid). 
 390 FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–20. 
 391 See N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105(B)(1) (litigation choice 
of law provision); id. r. 1-105(B)(2) (non-litigation choice of law provision). 
 392 Id. r. 1-105(B)(1) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1) 
(N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2015) (same). For a discussion of the non-litigation provision of the New 
York Code and Rules, see infra notes 397–399 and accompanying text. 
 393 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1). For a discussion of the non-litigation 
provision of the Model Rules, see infra note 400 and accompanying text. 
 394 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1). 
 395 See, e.g., id. r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (providing that the rule concerning “Candor Toward the Tribu-
nal” establishes “the special duties” of a lawyer to “act[] as an advocate in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding” and to “avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process”). 
 396 There is another problem with applying the Model Rules’ litigation choice of law provi-
sion. Consider a situation in which a lawyer-relator’s only connection to the state in which the 
court sits is that it is where the FCA lawsuit was filed. If the Model Rules’ litigation choice of law 
rule applies, then the lawyer can easily avoid restrictive state confidentiality rules by filing the 
FCA lawsuit in a state with favorable confidentiality exceptions, even when that state is not where 
the lawyer is licensed, where the lawyer principally practices, or where any of the pre-litigation 
conduct occurred. Under the FCA, a relator may bring an action “in any judicial district in which 
the defendant . . . can be found, resides, transacts business, or in which any act proscribed by [the 
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In FLPA I itself, the court’s apparent mistake in applying New York’s 
litigation choice of law provision was immaterial because application of the 
non-litigation choice of law provision would have achieved the same result: 
that provision dictates that “[i]f the lawyer is licensed to practice only in 
this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this state,”397 and Bibi 
was licensed only in New York. But what if Bibi was not licensed in New 
York? Such a situation is simply not contemplated under the New York 
choice of law rule, which assumes that the lawyer is licensed at least in 
New York and makes no provision for disciplining a non-New York lawyer, 
particularly one whose conduct has its predominant effect in a jurisdiction 
other than one in which he or she is licensed.398 This approach, which is 
followed in several other jurisdictions,399 makes sense in lawyer discipline 
cases, where the adopting jurisdiction is free to choose not to attempt to 
discipline non-admitted lawyers. But it makes little sense in other contexts, 
including federal court determinations of the eligibility of a lawyer-relator 
as a result of possibly unethical conduct. 
The Model Rules’ non-litigation choice of law provision does not suffer 
from this particular problem: indeed, it makes no reference to where the law-
yer is licensed to practice. Rather, Model Rule 8.5 provides that, for non-
litigation conduct, the rules to be applied are “the rules of the jurisdiction in 
which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the con-
duct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied 
to the conduct.”400 If this rule had been adopted in New York and applied in 
FLPA I, then the court could have determined that the relevant conduct oc-
curred either in New Jersey (where Bibi had been employed by Unilab and 
where he had presumably first disclosed confidences to his FLPA partners) or 
in New York (where Bibi disclosed confidential information in his sealed 
                                                                                                                           
statute] occurred.” 31 U.S.C. § 3732(a) (2012). Thus, relators may have considerable latitude in 
choosing among a number of potential jurisdictions in which the qui tam lawsuit could be filed. 
 397 N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-105(B)(2); see N.Y. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(2) (same); see also FLPA I, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37014, at *19–20 
(discussing choice of law provision of DR 1-105(B)(1)). 
 398 See N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(a)–(b) (discussing disciplinary authority for 
lawyers who are licensed to practice within the state).  
 399 New York follows the approach of the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5, which is also 
followed by the District of Columbia. See id.; see also D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5 
(D.C. BAR ASS’N 2015); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) 
(failing to include a provision regarding choice of law for a lawyer who is not licensed to practice 
within the state). 
 400 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1) (“A lawyer shall not be subject to disci-
pline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably 
believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.”). This is another aspect of the 
disciplinary rules that makes sense in the disciplinary context but not necessarily in other contexts. 
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complaint to both the court and the government, and where further disclo-
sures in connection with the lawsuit might be anticipated). To the extent that 
the “predominant effect” of the conduct might have occurred elsewhere, the 
court might have looked to the state where the defendants were located, 
which would have been either New Jersey, where Quest was headquartered, 
or California, where Unilab had been headquartered before becoming a whol-
ly owned subsidiary of Quest. 
If a federal court hearing FCA lawsuits is not compelled to look to the 
choice of law rules of the forum state to determine the ethical propriety of a 
qui tam relator’s conduct—and we believe it is not—then we suggest that 
the court should then be free to apply whatever choice of law rule it deems 
is best suited to the issue at hand, as an application of federal common 
law.401 Rather than start from scratch, we also suggest that the court adopt 
as federal law either the Model Rule choice of law provision for non-
litigation matters402 or the “most significant relationship” test adopted by 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.403 Under the Restatement’s 
provision for identifying the state with the most significant relationship with 
respect to the rights and duties between agents and their principals,404 the 
                                                                                                                           
 401 In disqualification cases, federal courts have long had a tendency to create common law 
and develop responses “largely unconstrained by formal rules.” McMorrow, supra note 385, at 3; 
see also Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 
156–57 (2005) (explaining that even when local district court rules provide for an exclusive source 
of law for attorney ethics, courts often rely on other standards). For a general discussion of the 
role of federal common law in filling gaps in federal statutes, see Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of 
Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). 
 402 For a discussion of why the Model Rules’ non-litigation provision is superior to the litiga-
tion provision on the question of the eligibility of an FCA relator to receive an award, see supra 
notes 397–401 and accompanying text. 
 403 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6. Under the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, courts are instructed to balance a number of factors in choosing “the applicable 
rule of law.” Id. This balancing test is generally described as an attempt to determine the state with 
“the most significant relationship” to the issue of law in question. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (providing that the 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws’ general balancing test seeks to determine “the rule with 
the most significant relationship to the charged offensive conduct,” and is similar to the “predomi-
nant effect” principle ushered in by revisions to Model Rule 8.5(b) in 1993); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 cmt. c (stating that the goal of balancing test is to 
“state a general principle, such as application of the local law ‘of the state of most significant 
relationship,’ which provides some clue to the correct approach but does not furnish precise an-
swers”). 
 404 Balance-of-factor tests are notoriously unpredictable; however, the Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws gives more specific guidance in provisions addressing different subject areas 
in which a dispute may arise, including tort, contract, or agency law. See supra note 403 and ac-
companying text. In our view, agency law best captures the fiduciary nature of the relationship 
between lawyer and client, and it is precisely the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship 
that underlies the rules on confidentiality and loyalty. See, e.g., Ritts, supra note 365, at 62–63 (in 
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court would then look to the substantive ethics rules of the state where the 
lawyer performed as an agent, or, if the performance occurred in several 
states, to the state where the lawyer most frequently acted on the client’s 
behalf.405 The two tests are similar,406 but the Restatement approach may be 
preferable as it avoids the need to determine whether the “predominant ef-
fect” of the lawyer’s conduct will be in a jurisdiction other than where the 
conduct occurred—a determination that is fraught with indeterminacy. 
CONCLUSION 
Whether lawyers should be permitted to seek financial rewards for 
blowing the whistle on their clients is a difficult normative question that we 
have not addressed in this Article. Answering that question will require ex-
ploration of the nature of the relationship between the lawyer and the client 
and consideration of whether lawyers occupy a role that is significantly dif-
ferent than other company insiders, who also owe obligations of confidenti-
ality and loyalty to the company. It will also require having a clear under-
standing of the extent of the obligations that lawyers owe to their clients 
under current legal doctrine, including any special obligations to entity cli-
ents. This is the descriptive project that we have undertaken. 
In this Article, we have explored the four doctrinal questions that are 
key to determining whether a lawyer may receive a whistleblower award 
under a federal program without violating state fiduciary law and state rules 
of professional conduct: (1) Under what circumstances may a lawyer dis-
close a client’s confidential information to others? (2) Under what circum-
stances does a lawyer’s obligation of loyalty preclude acting adversely to a 
client, including seeking personal benefit when engaging in conduct that is 
permissible for other purposes, such as to prevent or rectify harm to anoth-
er? (3) Are any of a lawyer’s obligations under state law preempted by fed-
eral law that provides for financial incentives for whistleblowers? (4) 
Which state’s law applies to lawyers who move from state to state as they 
work for national companies? 
                                                                                                                           
applying the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to a matter involving successive represen-
tation and a former government lawyer, the “issue could have been cast as one of agency law, with 
the ethics rules regulating an attorney/agent’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality”). But 
see White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Island Kitchens, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (applying 
the general provision of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 6 to a lawyer’s profes-
sional responsibility question); David A. Barry & William L. Boesch, Massachusetts Legal Mal-
practice Cases, 93 MASS. L. REV. 321, 339–40 (2011) (arguing for the application of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws’ provisions on contracts for the rendering of services). 
 405 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 291 & cmt. f. 
 406 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. h (referring to 
the 1993 version of Model Rule 8.5(b)). 
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As the reader has already discerned, these issues turn out to be enor-
mously complex. For example, state confidentiality exceptions differ widely 
among the states, and it is not clear whether or when disclosures in the course 
of seeking a financial reward are “reasonably necessary” either to prevent the 
perpetuation of continuing crimes or frauds or to rectify or mitigate past 
wrongdoing. State loyalty obligations include not only conflicts of interest 
rules for current and former clients—rules that may be difficult to apply in the 
context of FCA and Dodd-Frank whistleblowers—but also a lawyer’s com-
mon-law fiduciary duty not to profit from a client’s confidential information. 
This fiduciary duty applies to both current and former clients and is so broad 
that it would appear to prohibit any lawyer from seeking a financial reward 
for disclosing client information without the client’s consent. 
Given the potential breadth of a lawyer’s confidentiality and loyalty 
obligations, we question the view of the three court decisions that conclud-
ed without much discussion that the FCA does not preempt a lawyer’s ethi-
cal obligations under state law. None of these courts confronted the fact that 
federal courts in FCA cases involving nonlawyers have apparently preempt-
ed the state law fiduciary or contractual duties of nonlawyers if enforcing 
their state law obligations would effectively prevent them from serving as 
FCA relators. If these are indeed preemption cases, as we believe they are, 
then federal courts will need to distinguish lawyers from nonlawyers if the 
similar obligations of lawyers are not also to be preempted in at least some 
situations. Finally, there is no clear choice of law rule that federal courts 
must apply in determining which state’s ethics laws apply to a lawyer-
relator when there are several states with significant contacts with the mat-
ter. We recommend that federal courts develop their own federal common-
law choice of law rule for FCA cases, but we also acknowledge the difficul-
ty of formulating a choice of law rule that is both principled and predictable 
in its application. 
Unfortunately, only a few courts have addressed the issues we discuss 
in the context of the FCA, and none have done so in the context of Dodd-
Frank. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is unlikely that there will be many 
additional court decisions addressing whether and when lawyers can obtain 
financial incentives under these statutes. We anticipate few additional FCA 
suits brought by lawyer-relators against their former clients because the ap-
parent confidentiality and loyalty constraints discussed above make such 
suits less likely to succeed than those filed by nonlawyers. Because relators’ 
lawyers are generally paid on a contingent basis, a rational relators’ lawyer 
will be less likely to accept and pursue a lawyer-relator’s FCA case than one 
brought by a relator not limited by these ethical constraints. The key gate-
keeper for potential lawyer-relators is the relators’ bar, and they are likely to 
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recognize the greater risk they would be taking by agreeing to represent a 
lawyer-relator. 
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower program is also unlikely to produce 
court decisions on these issues. This is because the key decision-maker un-
der this statute is the SEC rather than the judiciary. The SEC will be (and 
perhaps already is) making its decisions about whether to grant whistleblow-
ing awards to lawyers through a secret proceeding that lacks an adversary 
presentation of issues and is largely insulated from judicial scrutiny. Thus, a 
company that might view itself as harmed by a lawyer-whistleblower’s dis-
closure to the SEC may never have an opportunity to contest the lawyer-
whistleblower’s initial tip or eventual award.407 
Despite our reluctance to address the normative questions involved in 
lawyer whistleblowing for financial reward, the ability of a Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower to maintain anonymity throughout the process leads us to 
conclude by raising yet another normative question. Even if financial re-
wards for lawyer-whistleblowers are appropriate in some circumstances, is 
a secret process, shielded from judicial review, ever appropriate for deter-
mining whether a particular lawyer is eligible to receive a whistleblower 
reward? 
It may be appropriate to grant lawyers financial incentives for blowing 
the whistle on a former client. But Dodd-Frank’s process for granting these 
awards—without an adversary presentation of the issues and without judi-
cial oversight—is a cause for concern. Another government program, asset 
forfeiture, arguably has similar parameters: a secretive administrative pro-
cess through which local law enforcement agencies seize property without 
any adversarial presentation of issues or evidence, with the burden on prop-
erty-owners to seek judicial review of such seizures.408 The record of the 
asset forfeiture program demonstrates both the power of using financial in-
                                                                                                                           
 407 As a formal matter, the SEC’s award decisions are subject to judicial review only if the 
SEC denies an award entirely or grants an award below the 10% statutory minimum. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F-13(a). As a practical matter, the respondent company may never know that the SEC’s 
investigation was triggered by a whistleblower’s tip or the identity of that whistleblower. Even 
though the SEC issues press releases regarding its whistleblower awards, those releases provide 
little specific information about the whistleblower, the respondent company, or the securities vio-
lations involved. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A); In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Con-
nection with [Undisclosed Party], supra note 260. Therefore the administrative process for grant-
ing whistleblower awards is unlikely to generate a matter subject to judicial review. 
 408 See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Highway Seizure in Iowa Fuels Debate About Asset-Forfeiture 
Laws, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/highway-
seizure-in-iowa-fuels-debate-about-asset-forfeiture-laws/2014/11/10/10f725fc-5ec3-11e4-8b9e-2ccd
ac31a031_story.html [http://perma.cc/8E9U-U8GM]. 
2015] Financial Rewards for Whistleblowing Lawyers 1775 
centives to enforce legal norms and the danger of combining those incen-
tives with a secret administrative process.409 
                                                                                                                           
 409 In January 2015, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice would curtail asset forfeitures. Attorney General Prohibits Federal Agency Adoptions of Assets 
Seized by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Except Where Needed to Protect Public Safety, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-prohibits-
federal-agency-adoptions-assets-seized-state-and-local-law [http://perma.cc/DQ5C-6EMX]. 
   
 
